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ABSTRACT
Innovation is a hot topic; innovation is happening everywhere. Innovation is "romantic",
reaching for the stars, against all odds, solving the problem no one thought possible. Most CEOs
would not characterize survival as "romantic". Innovate or perish; the mantra, the truth, plain,
stark, cold and naked. It gets worse; the environment is rapidly changing. Sophisticated
customers are demanding quick responses with low cost, high quality products. What once
worked with brilliant success is now failing. If innovation is happening everywhere, it is
increasingly not happening here.
During the past two years, a multi-vendor government project consisting of two vendors
geographically segregated across three regions has seen tremendous success followed by almost
total collapse. Initial program status and progress indicate near exponential trajectory: ahead of
schedule, under budget and all functionality present. However, collapse was not too far off. The
integration effort was a complete failure. Key schedule milestone dates were continuously
missed. The gap between functionality believed completed and really completed widened. The
story reads like a classic runaway project. Worse, the budget was near exhaustion.
The central contribution of the analysis is the identification of the innovation trap. The
innovation trap identifies conflicting corporate objectives governing the innovation strategy for
new business development and the product development strategy of existing programs in the
product pipeline.
This study examines the innovation trap by applying System Dynamics techniques to develop a
set of heuristics not only to identify collapse conditions but also how to address the problem.
The goal of this study is to develop a concept for an improved organization and structure for
today's high technology product companies where innovation is crucial for corporate success.
Thesis supervisor: Brad Morrison
Title: Professor of Engineering Systems
3
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Jeff Manning has a passion for building systems. He enjoys the many challenges that
accompany complex systems. From the hard work, sweat and tears of despair ("will it ever
work?") slowly turning way to a quality product is an awesome experience. Jeff has been
architecting, designing and developing software for close to twenty years. Through the years, he
developed software across a wide range of applications including but not limited to device
drivers for a variety of hardware platforms, health care applications, real time embedded
solutions. In addition, he has witnessed huge changes in the software industry from the arcane
methods of the earlier 80's to the boom of the 90's to the crash of the millennium.
Jeff Manning joined the System Design and Management (SDM) program to augment his
knowledge of software/product development. After twenty years, he wanted to be involved in all
aspects of system design - to learn to architect/design complex systems with proven (and often
evolving) project processes maintaining a system wide vision, to master the process of taking
corporate strategy to functionality and the skills of identifying and understanding key value
propositions required to exceed customer's expectations.
Through SDM, Jeff obtained the skills required to bridge the gap between strategy and the
building of the product; providing the instrumental leadership in determining what product is
built. Equally important to the technical underpinnings of project design is leadership and
management skills. The ability to align corporate, strategic objectives with the delivery of
software is a crucial skill for the software industry or for that matter, any industry. One step
further, Jeff mastered strategic management, how companies are organized to solve complex
problems and how companies fund these efforts.
Jeff Manning graduated in 1986 from Boston College (BC) with a Bachelor of Arts in
Mathematics. This thesis work completes the requirements for his Masters of Science in
Engineering and Management from the Systems Design and Management Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
4
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Cambridge, Massachusetts Jeff Manning
May 9, 2008
First, I would like to thank Dr. Brad Morrison, my supervisor, for his patience, insight, and
constant guidance during this research.
In addition to Professor Morrison, I also had tireless support from industry. Special thanks go to
Lt. Col. Pettyjohn - whose constant advice, guidance and positive attitude made this research
effort real and a valuable learning experience. Next, Major Braddock, Lt. Col Krawczyk, Lt. Col
Eisenbies and Dr. Kuschel, I thank for thank for their help in support of my research efforts.
It's been a long road! One I never regretted for an instance. MIT was an awesome experience -
a place of challenge and growth. I have also been blessed with a great cohort. It is difficult to
single out any peer for fear of leaving one out - you were all truly great. Nate Minami, Michael
Visee, Roberto Acosta, Jess Kopczynski, and Luis Mesada without your kindness and patience I
doubt I would have survived. Your tireless efforts on all of the team projects have made the
effort worth the entire wait.
Finally, and clearly most important, I am grateful for the continuous love and support of my
family; my beautiful wife Jennifer, and my wonderful children Ryan and Patrick John (PJ).
They are my inspiration. I hope to provide you, as high school students yourself, with an
example of the required hard work and commitment to succeed in school! If not, I am going for
my PhD while you attend college - roomies!
5
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
PART I BACKGROUND
Chapter 1: Introduction 9
Section 1.1 Motivation 12
Section 1.2 Problem Definition 13
Section 1.3 Framework 14
PART II LITERATURE RESEARCH 16
Chapter 2 Organization 16
Chapter 3 Non-equity Alliance 17
Chapter 4 Team Performance 25
Section 4.1 Cognitive Ability 26
Section 4.2 Collaboration 27
Section 4.3 Correlation of findings 28
PART III RESEARCH METHOD 29
Chapter 5 Research Approach 29
Chapter 6 Application of Methods 32
Chapter 7 Analysis 39
PART IV HYPOTHESIS 43
Chapter 8 Team Definitions 45
Leadership and Technical Ability 46
Scanning Horizon - Foresight 47
A Team 50
B Team 53
Chapter 9 Innovation Triangle 55
Section 9.1 New Business Generation 55
Section 9.2 Innovation Strategy 57
Section 9.3 Project Management 59
PART V ANALYSIS OF THE INNOVATION TRIANGLE 61
Chapter 10 System Dynamics 61
Chapter 11 Description of System Dynamics Model 61
Section 11.1 Skill Mix 62
Section 11.2 Policy 63
Section 11.3 Adjusting Team Size 65
6
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
Section 11.4 Rework Cycle 66
Chapter 12 Analysis of System Dynamics Model (Simulation) 66
Section 12.2 Successful Project Analysis - Optimal Conditions 68
Section 12.3 Successful A/B Team Only Project Analysis 71
Section 12.4 Researched Project Team Analysis 75
Section 12.5 Role of Test Results 77
Section 12.6 Design Flaw Discovered 82
Section 12.7 Summary 85
Section 12.8 Handoff Analysis 86
PART VI CONCLUSION 94
APPENDIX A: MODEL EQUATIONS 98
APPENDIX B: GLOBAL COLLAGE 115
APPENDIX C: ALPHA COLLAGE 116
APPENDIX D: BETA COLLAGE 117
APPENDIX E: GAMMA COLLAGE 118
PART VII BIBLIOGRAPHY 119
7
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
Figure I-1 Innovation Triangle................................................................................................ 11
Figure II-1 Organizational Complexity .................................................................................. 19
Figure II-2 Pushed to Breaking Point ..................................................................................... 21
Figure II-3 Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 22
Figure II-4 Request(s) For Information .................................................................................. 23
Figure II-5 Organization Complexity ..................................................................................... 24
Figure II-6 Alliance Complexity Map .................................................................................... 25
Figure III-1 Research Approach ............................................................................................. 29
Figure III-2 EVMS Data ............................................................................................................... 35
Figure III-3 S/W Integration Progress Inchworm............................................ 36
Figure IV-1 Innovation Triangle............................................................................................. 44
Figure IV-2 Key Attributes of Personnel................................................................................ 46
Figure IV-3 Time Horizon ......................................................................................................... 49
Figure IV-4 George Washington Crossing the Delaware ...................................... ....... 50
Figure IV-5 'A' Horizon Scanning ............................................................................................... 51
Figure IV-6 "A" Member Effectiveness ...................................................... 52
Figure IV-7 'B' Member Mental Models....................................................................................... 53
Figure IV-8 'B' Member Horizon Scanning ......................................... ................................ 54
Figure IV-9 New Business Generation ............................................... ................... 56
Figure IV- 10 Transition ................................................................................................................ 58
Figure IV-11 Removal Event........................................................................................................ 59
Figure V-1 Full System Dynamics Model ..................................................... 62
Figure V-2 Firefighting................................................................................................................. 64
Figure V-3 Attribute Map ....................................................................................................... 67
Figure V-4 Test Results ................................................................................................................ 78
Figure V-5 Incremental vs. Big Bang ...................................................................................... 79
Figure V-6 Table for Effect of Work Progress .................................................. 80
Figure V-7 Handoff Analysis................................................................... 86
Figure V-8 Transition Parameters........................................................................................... 87
Figure V-9 Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality ........................................ ........... 88
8
C Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
PART I Background
"The beginning is the most important part of the work" (Plato 4th cent. BC)
Chapter 1: Introduction
Innovation, the first reduction of a concept to useful practice in a culture, is a hot topic;
innovation is happening everywhere. Seldom has a day expired without innovation being a key
theme for corporate America. It is a subject of endless debate among executives. Good
innovation differentiates, separating a company from its competition. Many companies have
integrated innovation into key strategic initiatives.
Innovation is "romantic", reaching for the stars, against all odds, solving the problem no one
thought possible. It is the motivated team; the team performing and executing to the impossible.
The bonding and the lab camaraderie develops a spirit overpowering any weakness. To work on
problems previously deemed impossible creates excitement, transforming the work place into a
learning environment. Today's work force is different, hungry and looking for opportunity.
People not only want to express themselves, they want to make a difference. But there is a catch;
people rarely perform at this level. People must be challenged. People must feel some pain, a
sense of urgency, fear, before this level of performance is reached. Innovation requires never
ending high levels of execution - difficult to sustain even in the most pristine of conditions.
Innovation is survival. Most CEOs would not characterize survival as "romantic". Innovate or
perish; the mantra, the truth, plain, stark, cold and naked. It gets worse; the environment is
rapidly changing. Sophisticated customers are demanding quick responses with low cost, high
quality products. What once worked with brilliant success is now failing. Fierce competition
quickly imitates best practice eroding margins further stretching innovation resources. The bar
has been raised; who is going to blink first? Unfortunately, companies fail to adapt to these
emerging trends; corporate inertia is difficult to change. More often than not, companies are not
only unable to make change they are unwilling, burying their heads in the sand longing for a
yesterday long since expired. Is it an illusion, a nightmare? If innovation is happening
everywhere, it is increasingly not happening here.
9
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
For every innovator, there is an innovative strategy. Every day more innovation methods appear
to discover customer needs creating the next wave or buzz: Voice of the Customer (VOC),
Ethnographic Research, Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation Technique (ZMET), House of Quality,
TQM. The list of acronyms is dizzying. To develop the product there are equal methodologies:
waterfall, staged gate, iterative, rapid prototyping, extreme programming. The list is endless.
In today's challenging economic environment, the only way to survive is to innovate. Innovate
is more than new products, it encompasses innovating strategies and business models.
Unfortunately there are many obstacles to innovation 2 including but not limited to:
* Slow Development Times
* Lack of Coordination
* Metrics/Measuring Innovation
* Incentives
More interesting, a recent market survey 3 based on follow-up interviews with executives
"reveals the importance of aligning innovation initiatives with corporate strategy and of in-depth
customer understanding." 4 Corporate strategy and customer understanding are connected to
innovation strategy. In a similar McKinsey Report 5 70% of the executives surveyed named
innovation as one of their top three priorities for driving growth. "Although more than a third of
top managers (senior VP level and higher) say innovation is part of the leadership team's agenda,
an equal number say their companies govern innovation in an ad hoc way." 6
1 Business Week Online. April 24, 2006. The Worlds Most Innovative Companies. <
http://www.businessweek.com/@@5hfAgocQOSPwNx4A/magazine/content/06_ 7/b3981401.htm>2 Andrew, James P. et al. "Innovation 2007: BCG Senior Management Survey." The Boston Consulting Group,
August 2007.
3 Business Week Online. December 19, 2007. "The State of Innovation." <
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/dec2007/id20071219_302022_page_2.htm>
4 Jaruzeleski, Barry and Kevin Dehoff. "The Customer Connection: The Global Innovation 1000." Strategy +
Business, Booz, Allen, Hamilton. 12/10/07 < http://www.strategy-
business.com/resiliencereport/resilience/rr00053>
5 "How Companies approach innovation: A McKinsey Global Survey"." McKinsey Quarterly. Oct. 2007
6 Ibid, p6
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This is not surprising. CEOs understand that innovation is a critical success factor for their
organizations. They can recite the key subtleties of aligning innovation with corporate strategy
and the critical role of understanding the customer. They just do not understand how to manage
the innovation process. When pressed, these very managers responded "while 40% of top
managers say the problem is they don't have the right employees, only 31% of other executives
agreed. And among executives who said they did have the necessary talent, less than a quarter of
top managers felt corporate culture inhibited progress, while almost a third of lower-ranked
executives thought culture was a problem." 7
Is it the talent of the employees? Is it culture? Can my manager's even manage? Am I building
what the customer's even want? More importantly whom haven't I blamed for my failure?
Attribution error is a misused weapon; easy to do, seldom bears fruit until one looks into the
mirror. Reminiscent of a childhood cartoon "We have met the enemy... and he is us." 8
The central contribution of the analysis is the identification of the innovation trap.
Figure I-1 Innovation Triangle
7 Business Week Online. December 19, 2007. "The State of Innovation." <
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/dec2007/id20071219 302022_page_2.htm>
8 From the foreword to The Po-qo Papers, Copyright 1952-53. See Pogo Cartoon strip <
http://www.igopogo.com/we_have_met.htm>
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The innovation trap is a delicate balance of a globally optimized innovation strategy across all
projects (as well as future new business) and the product development strategy of existing
programs in the product pipeline. Each strategy is governed by the current corporate
resource/skill mix.
Section 1.1 Motivation
During the past two years, a multi-vendor, non-equity alliance 9 government project consisting of
two vendors geographically segregated across three regions (CT, FL and CA) has seen
tremendous success followed by almost total collapse. Initial program status and progress
indicate near exponential trajectory: ahead of schedule, under budget and all functionality
present. Awards were won (Program of the Year, Best Practice etc)! Promotions given out!
Staggering award fees resulting in tens of millions of dollars were earned by the vendors.
However, collapse was not too far off. The integration effort was a complete failure. Key
schedule milestone dates were continuously missed. The gap between functionality believed
completed and really completed widened. Management instituted mandatory six-day weeks.
The story reads like a classic runaway project. Worse, the budget was near exhaustion. The only
funding left to complete the program was the management reserve (MR).
Why does it take so long to complete technological development? Why is it so difficult to create
a feasible schedule and "march" to it? When asked, companies site exogenous factors - events
beyond their control -- as the source of the delays. When asked for a root cause analysis of three
consecutive schedule slips, program management cited'0 :
* Delay(s): Hardware, dependent sub-systems and integration
* "Infant mortality of third party test environment"
* Stability of the infrastructure
9 Farok J. Contractor and Peter Lorange eds., Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1984. P56. A Nonequity alliance are agreements between partners to cooperate in some way (to
jointly carry out a research project) but they do not involved the creation of a new firm nor does either partner
purchase equity in the other. Killing further delineates "Shared-activity alliance" as an agreement between firms to
work directly together to achieve a common objective.
10 These "root analysis" findings were revealed during in depth interviews
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* Added capability
Interesting what was NOT noted in any root cause analysis - the role the organization played in
creating the delays and cost overruns. When specifically asked about the role of the organization
including the protection of proprietary information, each vendor vehemently denied its role in the
current collapse. It was the strong denial that sparked an interest and created a hypothesis -
could the organization itself with its two-year evolution foster the current culture and inertia
resulting in the staggeringly poor performance? Initial research into this question proved fruitful.
Not "satisfied" with contractor (industry team) analysis, the customer management through its
own expertise initiated an internal self assessment into what prevented the industry team from
achieving the established base line (schedule) goals. The effort was to identify reasons for the
delay (from original delays through current delays) and provide guidance as to what other areas
might emerge as high risk.
Section 1.2 Problem Definition
Organizational evolution has long been studied. The associated challenges are not new. Several
scholars have presented the notion of organizational behavior as a "near irreversible momentum
of increasing bureaucratization and goal displacement"' '1 ,12,13 others argue that "organizations
become more stable until replaced during 'gales of destruction'". 14 Authors have even argued
and focused on "the heroic executives radically transforming their organizations as
environmental conditions changed."' 5 In all, opinions regarding organization evolution span the
gambit from the inevitable, to the external forces of destructive gales to the super human heroics
of key executives.
1 Tushman, M. and E. Romanelli (1985) "Organizational Evolution: A metamorphosis model of convergence and
reorientation", in L.L. Cummings and Barry Straw (Eds), Research in Organizational Behavior, 7: 171-222.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
12 Weber, M. The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Scribner, 1952
13 Merton, R. K. Social theory and social structure. New York; The Free Press, 1968.
14 Schumpeter, J. A. The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934
15 Chandler, A. D. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the history of American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press 1962.
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© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
Three organizational evolutionary frameworks are generally agreed upon:
* Ecology Models 16
* Adaptation Modelsl7
* Transformational Models 18
This paper leverages a punctuated equilibrium model where organizations progress through
convergent periods punctuated by periods of reorientations 19. An attempt is made to understand
the roles that performance and the role organizational evolution plays during both convergent
periods as well as during periods of reorientation. Our research attempts to understand:
* How and why the organization evolved?
* Why the organization seemingly failed overnight?
The basic problem of this thesis is to better understand the nature and characteristics of
organizational evolution and its delicate interplay with larger corporate dynamics including a
company's resource mix, its innovation strategy and its risk policy. Even more important, this
research attempts to understand patterns in organizational evolution that discriminate between
the success and failure of companies.
This paper models (using causal loops) the organizational evolution of a government program.
The paper focuses on change with the initial introduction of the concept followed by a series of
convergent steps and strategic moves that ultimately lead to the collapse and failure of a
development organization. Failure was measured by a two-year slip and a seventy million dollar
budget overrun.
Section 1.3 Framework
The following sections detail the investigation, research and analysis to build a causal loop
model.
Section II details our methods of data collection and analysis
16 Freeman, J. Organizational life cycles and natural selection process. In B Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds),
Research in Organizational Behavior (Vol 4). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc. 1982
17
18
19 Tushman and Romanelli, p 173.
14
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Section III presents the basic hypothesis/findings
Section IV develops a dynamic, causal loop model detailing the innovation trap
Section V explores the implications of the innovation trap
15
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PART II Literature Research
Chapter 2 Organization
The project team is a DoD acquisition consisting of a joint effort combining the efforts of
industry teams (contractors) and government management - System Program Office (SPO).
DoD acquisitions are loosely characterized by20:
* A unique set of Government and contractor organizations and personnel
* A large diverse set of policies, strategies and processes
* A large unique set of political, management, and technical activities
* A dynamic political, budgetary, and technical environment
* One chance to succeed
Acquisitions are complex, dynamic, and interconnected socio-economic systems21. The team
spanned several disciplines including, but not limited to, hardware (mechanical, electrical),
software, quality assurance, integration, logistics and safety. The industry team consisted of
approximately eighty (80) software engineers and their managers (including program managers)
from three unique organizations. In addition to the actual development team, the overall effort
was lead by government management (the customer, SPO). The customer organization was lead
by a Colonel (responsible for several programs) who left the day-to-day project management of
this specific project to a Lieutenant Colonel. The Lt. Col had a team size of approximately
twenty people spread out across three flights (sub teams) mirroring some of the aforementioned
industry disciplines.
20 Abelson, L., R. Adams and S. Eslinger. "Acquisition Modeling: The Key to Managing Complex Acquisition
Complexity." 3rd OSD Conference on the Acquisition of Software Intensive Systems, January 2006.
By and large the model here is a glorified Undiscovered re-work model trying to account for
both SPO and non SPO personnel. For more details into the Undiscovered Re-Work loop please see: "The
Rework Cycle: Benchmarks for the Project Manager", Project Management Journal, Volume XXIV, March
1993 as well as "Swords and Plowshares: The Rework Cycles of Defense and Commercial Software
Development Projects" American Programmer, May 1993.
21 Ibid, p3
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For the purposes of this paper, the focus is on the trials and tribulations of the software
development effort. By and large this effort is responsible for the majority of the delays (original
and current) of the program. The author maintained a leadership position on the overall software
team.
Chapter 3 Non-equity Alliance
The central theme underlying any alliance (joint venture, non-equity alliance, minority alliance)
is complexity 22. It is simple: complexity can lead to failure or great success. Alliance
complexity is defined by two concepts: task complexity and organizational complexity. The
skills in terms of cognitive ability and leadership required to manage a complex task using a
complex organization are very different from the simple case. To succeed, it is important for
executives to understand the differences. A complex alliance is doomed to fail without the
correct resource.
Section 3.1.1 Task Complexity
Three criteria are used to gauge task complexity 23:
1. Scope of Alliance Activities. This includes but is not limited to the number of
objectives, the duration and the number of business functions the alliance encompasses
2. Environment Uncertainty: This includes overall demand, customer preferences,
government actions and supplier competence
3. Relevant Partner Resources and Skills: This addresses if the partners have the
resources and skills necessary for the alliance to succeed.
For the project under research, the task complexity was moderate to great. The task is a next
generation sensor (radar) program. Not only is the number of requirements high but the need for
tight business alignment is great. Success is mutually coupled. The current duration of the
project is in excess of five (5) years. Significant effort is involved in prototyping and bringing a
small volume of sensors to market is significant. The environment is dynamic; the project has
seen significant leadership change at both the contractor as well as the government sides.
22 Ibid, p 57.
23 Ibid, p58.
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Although some aspects of the technology are rooted in legacy programs, the program effort is a
full life-cycle modernization effort. The complexity of the effort stems from the increased
unprecedented scale of the program, to the updated cutting edge massive parallel processor
platform. At the time the contractors involved in the program were considered world-class
operations with significant expertise. Here expertise is defined not only in years of experience
but significant prior artwork from legacy systems. Unfortunately, this assumption proved wrong.
The experts from the previous generation of technology and innovation began to move on, and in
some cases retire. This left the corporate asset of algorithms and designs without the key design
engineers.
Section 3.1.2 Organizational Complexity
Organizational complexity is the result of how decisions are made. Complexity is generated
when personnel from one firm make and implement decisions that affect both firms.
18
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Task Complexity Factors
Alliance Scope
Deliver Complex Product,Alliance Objective Make ProfitMake Profit
Number of business functions Many
Number of business products Many
Number of markets One











Figure II-1 Organizational Complexity
In its basic diagnosis, organizational complexity can be captured with two key parameters: nature
and frequency of the interactions24 . Interaction can be difficult. Personnel from differing firms
do not share the same incentive systems, attitudes, and possibly beliefs. This is a direct
ramification of the corporate culture of the firms involved. Worse, it should not be a surprise
that the alliance firms may have differing objectives. These differing objectives are subtle, often
lurking below the surface. Only when joint decision-making is required do these differences
surface. Additional communication can also interfere with progress. When "stuck", decisions
must be elevated to higher-level authority (executives) split across both firms. The roles firms
play: Prime/Sub, 50-50 split control, shared management and independent all impact
performance. Specifically, resolution times can be further impacted if partner firms have equal
influence (50-50) in decision making. Building consensus, with differing objectives can be an
arduous process. It stands to reason that the more routine and less frequent the interaction, the
more simple the organization.
Besides the interaction complexity, four criteria affect organizational complexity:
1. Number of Partners: The more partners, the greater potential for organizational
complexity. Well defined roles and spheres of influence can mitigate risks
24 Ibid, p 59
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2. Role of Each Partner: The more partners seeing themselves as equal roles in managing
the alliance, the more potential for organizational complexity. Building consensus is both
time consuming and difficult. Interestingly, the role played by the partners reflects the
quantity and similarity of skills and resources brought to the team. "The more similar the
skills, the more likely for shared decision making alliance" 25
3. Level of Trust: Dysfunctional interaction can result is the alliance lacking trust.
4. Task Complexity: The simpler the task, the simpler the organization. Alliances
requiring the combined skills and resources of partner companies need additional
complex organizational arrangements.
For the project under research, the alliance was formed as a shared management effort with split
(50-50) control both in size of effort, scope of work as well as financial rewards. Additionally,
each company brought in unique skills and resources required to complete the product. Although
there are two corporations involved on the balance sheet, one of the companies is segregated into
two divisions from an earlier acquisition strategy. This had the effect of create three (3)
"virtual" companies.
By and large, the companies trust (or "mutual forbearance" 26) each other. One issue governing
trust is the role of proprietary information. If the joint effort requires "proprietary" information
to complete the task, trust is a key issue. Proprietary technology represents a significant
competitive advantage. These technologies are fiercely defended and carefully, methodically
protected. The effect of proprietary information is hard line emphasis on well-defined roles.
25 Ibid, p62
26 The term mutual forbearance was a term taken from chapter 2 Buckley, P.J and M. Casson. "A Theory of
Cooperation in International Business". It capture the notion that alliance partners would "deliberately pass up short
term advantage" which they could take at the expense of their partners, in the interest in keeping the alliance alive.
20
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With Time, Increasing Accumulation of
conflict, stress
Figure II-2 Pushed to Breaking Point
System Proprietary Information (SPI) also became a weapon/escape as needed. As a weapon,
engineers could immediately claim the technology was proprietary. The effect was reduced
openness and visibility. In fact, the only means of one partner communicating with another's
proprietary technology was through a well-defined interface. The interface was maintained in a
non proprietary documented called the Interface Control Document (or ICD). The ICD
published the interfaces and data structures used to solicit services from the technology. These
interfaces can range from simple asynchronous calls to very complex, state based calling
mechanism with stringent timing requirements.
Even with the ICD, the net effect was to squelch communication and increase stress levels. Due
to the layered, modular architecture of the product, higher-level functionality is often layered on
lower level (closer to the hardware) constructs. Services were "opened" by service calls to the
lower layer documented by the ICD. An arbitrary layering mechanism is presented in the
following figure. In an ideal world, this is a sound practice. However, this mechanism can
quickly break down and all but reduce communication and harden positions.
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To illustrate this claim (there are many other similar cases). Consider an application required
NAVIGATION services. The low level NAVIGATION service wrapped a proprietary hardware
solution for the navigation instrument of an airplane. The navigation system is responsible for
determining the plane location, its heading, altitude speed (there are other features but these are
beyond the scope of the discussion). The application leverages and exposes interface data
(location, heading, speed etc).
The issue is subtle, but one that causes accumulating stress and significant communication
overhead. Both of these issues can impact the performance of the team. If there is a problem
(bug), the application team writes up a problem report and submits the issue to the Navigation
team requesting additional information. The Navigation team responds with a possible solution.
This repeats until the problem is solved (see below figure).
22





Figure 11-4 Request(s) For Information
This "request for information" model is a low bandwidth, high involvement, effort which can
quickly escalate high pressure, high stress environments. The application began realizing
schedule pressure and started to report the Navigation services as blocking their forward
progress. In response, the Navigation services team responds, "We have answered all of the
questions." Not only that, in our lab, "our solution checked against the truth data (a known test
bed with an agreed upon, known truth) proved out correctly". We are being blamed for their
inability to deliver their functionality. There is no trust; the alliance is broken.
To break this attribution error chain, program management must get involved to expose the
internal workings. In our example, the navigation service was modified to expose the raw stream
of data it captures from the hardware (the proprietary information) to the application. As it turns
out, the issue was not in the navigation services at all, rather, it was in the application's use of the
data in combination with another service. However, without exposing this data, the problem was
in communication, not in engineering. All told, this problem burned eight weeks of schedule
initially expected to last only three. People can hide ignorance behind a proprietary wall in hope
of a sunny day - in short, they are buying themselves time at the cost of their partner.
23
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Note: It is not possible for the application team to obtain the source code, compile the code into a
locally debugged version of their product and debug the problem. All debug information (most
importantly the symbols) is stripped out of the code. In theory, the application team can step
through the binary, proprietary service code in an attempt to reverse engineer the problem. This
is an extremely tedious and time-consuming task. Additionally, this type of activity was
prohibited in the alliance.
Figure II-5 Organization Complexity
In conclusion, our organizational design will be complex.
Section 3.1.3 Combining Complexities - Alliance Envelop 27
Killing28 constructed the alliance envelop as a tool for understanding the complexities of
alliances. As previously proposed, our project is concerned with high task complexity endeavor.
Additionally, our organization is a shared management, split control (50-50) alliance where the
skills of all both partners is required in order to complete the product.
27 Ibid, p64
28 Farok J. Contractor and Peter Lorange eds., Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1984. Chaper 3 - Understanding Alliances. Killing studied several alliances. Based on the data,
he devices the Alliance Envelop. The relationships realized a non-linear plot.
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Figure II-6 Alliance Complexity Map
Despite the great challenges, many companies successfully use joint ventures. Managers quickly
discover there is a lot to learn in the design and management of a joint venture. Unfortunately,
joint ventures do have a "high overall failure rate and many of the failures are very costly for the
partner companies." 29 Business leaders must constantly think about effective ways of managing
a joint venture and tailor a unique specific management approach to the alliance envelope.
"Knowledge of what to expect with different types ofjoint ventures - even the recognition there
are different types - is a key to prevention of failure." 30 It gets worse, the inter company reliance
can change dramatically over time. As circumstances change, the venture must adapt.
Flexibility to meet inevitable challenges is critical; maintaining the status quo is not always a
successful play.
Chapter 4 Team Performance
Organizational failures are rooted in flawed data analysis that is used to guide corporate
decisions. At its core, flawed analysis results in poor decisions with unfortunate consequences.
Teams and team members provide analytical work integrating multiple sources of data and draw
conclusions. Teams are responsible for the analysis from which managers and executives must
29 Killing, Peter J. "How to make a global joint venture work." Harvard Business review, May-June 1982, p 120-7
30 Ibid, p 127
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use to execute actions. Research31 indicates there are two robust factors in shaping analytical
work: raw cognitive ability and collaborative planning. In other words, successful analysis
requires both "cognitive and social processes"32
Analytic work is defined as work involving several steps33:
* Recognition of the situation in need of assessment
* Definition of the problem
* Creation/Selection of the information to be considered
* Pooling knowledge and coordinating member input
* Decision making
Literature suggests team analytical performance in accomplishing these "steps" is poor. Good
team processes (needed to accomplish these steps) does not necessarily lead to good team
performance. Teams combine information poorly often omitting critical data and generally do
not coordinate expertise resulting in biased weight to the strongest voice (or most convincing or
person in leadership). Worse, a team can always get "lucky" - a team with terrible processes
somehow manages to generate a solid solution.
Research indicates that a combination of both raw cognitive ability as well as group strategies
can greatly improve team effectiveness. The aforementioned dysfunctions can be eliminated
with a well-designed team implementing a group performance strategy that is consistent and
aligned to current environment activities.
Section 4.1 Cognitive Ability
Cognitive ability and team effectiveness are directly connected. Considerable evidence supports
the notion that cognitive ability shapes team effectiveness. The intelligence of team members has
been show to predict team effectiveness 34' 35, team learning 36, and in cases of unfamiliar tasks 37,
31 Hackman, J. Richard (2007). "What does it take to figure out what is going on?", Tech Report No. 4,
http://groupbrain.wjh.harvard.edu
32 Ibid, p3.
33 Ibid, p 4.
LePine, J. A. (2005). Adaptation of teams in response to unforeseen change: Effects of goal difficulty and team
composition in terms of cognitive ability and goal orientation. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 90, 1153-1167.
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good performance. Furthermore, team's use of cognitive ability is based on two criteria: task
requirements and clear member ability definition38 . If a solution is required, members will
quickly identify who has the necessary skill set to complete the job.
Unfortunately, for analytical work, neither task requirements nor member abilities are clear.
Operating in this environment requires collaborative planning. Collaborative planning helps
teams to deal with ambiguity. Collaborative planning helps team members identify capabilities
within the group. Knowing this information helps the team to leverage these skills necessary for
team success. Teams are given the opportunity to "converse about their work strategy for
enhanced team performance only when members had been assigned roles that were incongruent
with their abilities." 39 Conversely, collaboration did not help when task and ability are closely
aligned. Rather, in this condition, collaboration impedes "performance when critical expertise
was on the team." 40 As such, research indicates "interaction of team ability and collaborative
planning more strongly predicts performance than team ability alone." 41
Section 4.2 Collaboration
Even in the direst of conditions, collaboration rarely occurs spontaneously. Collaboration
requires intervention on the part of management (and or leadership). Intervention allows for
team members to engage in "strategizing". The process has been shown to improve team
performance. Yet, collaborative planning is not a cure all. In high performance teams,
collaboration impedes team progress. Here teams focus their abilities to complete the job done.
In addition, collaborative planning cannot make up for lack of raw cognitive ability or poorly
formed teams. In these cases, collaboration is useless.
35Neuman, G. A., Wagner, S. H., & Christiansen, N. D. (1999). The relationship between work team personality
composition and the job performance of teams. Group & Organization Management, 24, 28-45.
36Ellis, A. P. J et. al (2003). Team Learning: Collectively connecting the dots. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 88,
821-835.
37 Devine, D. J., & Philips, J. L. (2001). Do smarter teams do better: A meta-analysis of cognitive ability and team
performance. Small Group Research, 32, 503-528.
Faraj, S., & Sproull, L. (2000). Coordinating expertise in software development teams. Management Science, 46,
1554-1568.
39 Hackman, p 7.40 Hackman, p.7
41 Hackman, p. 7
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Section 4.3 Correlation of findings
These findings are consistent with our qualitative research. Typical organizational practice
involves the process of assigning individuals with special expertise that a team task requires.
Their assigned team role is based on their specific abilities; they receive the optimum position.
This has the added effect of eliminating any need to communicate with team members. "I am an
expert, I know what I am doing - full speed ahead." This behavior allows for isolationism
(away from the team) concentrating only on my task at hand. There are several problems with
this typical practice. Because of the isolation, team members are generally unable to draw upon
these capabilities. Teams that rely on these pockets of isolated excellence often experience poor
overall team performance. Unless the team used collaboration planning and intervention, others
may have difficulty leveraging the pockets of expertise and the overall program may suffer as a
consequence. Based on our qualitative research, this is similar to our 'A' player and team
definition.
In a slightly worse case, teams can be poorly formed with little raw cognitive ability and lacking
in leadership/management. Here no amount of collaboration can save the day. As part of the
innovation strategy (see next section), 'A' players and leadership are replaced with cheaper, less
capable 'B' players. This approach can quickly erode team effectiveness. Worse, the team
cannot solve its problems without external intervention.
However, research into team effectiveness identifies a combination of raw cognitive ability and
collaborative leadership skills required for optimal chances of success. Again, qualitative
research provides a glimpse of this behavior. Unfortunately it is only an unintended side effect
of the innovation triangle. For a brief time, through sub optimal processes, the team is effective.
During a "transition" period, the team is built with both the cognitive ability and great
leadership. Unfortunately, this is short lived.
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PART III Research Method
"Remember, it took only one apple hitting Newton on the headfor him to have some pretty
profound insights" (Dr. Harry West, Guest Lecturer, MIT, Listening to the Customer 15.821,
September 19, 2007)
Chapter 5 Research Approach
To understand this incredible run up of success followed by incredible collapse our research
efforts focused on three distinct fronts: ethnographic42 research, metrics/archival data and
qualitative research. Leveraging these three tools allowed the author to triangulate to an
emerging theory. Additionally, the multi-faceted approach allowed for more substantiation





Figure III-1 Research Approach
As cited, why two qualitative methods? Simple, this problem is happening in real time. Not
only do we not known the answer, we do not know the questions to ask. We only understand the
current trend - incredible collapse as detected by extremely poor performance. To learn, we
must engage in conversation with relevant subjects. Our situation is worse - sometimes the
answer is not know or cannot be articulated by the subjects. The ethnographic tool derives its
solutions by inference from observed behavior. Observation identifies questions that can be
42 Glauser, G. G and A. L. Strauss. 1967. The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research.
Chicago: Aldine.
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checked with qualitative methods, our second research tool. Ethnographic research also has an
emotional feel to an issue. The research can see the pain in its very context as it is happening in
real time. This allows the researcher to develop this "pain". context into their qualitative
questioning.
Cornerstone to the investigation is ethnographic research. Ethnographic graphic research starts
with a conscious attitude of almost complete ignorance. Rather than study people, ethnography
is motivated to experience the environment; learn by observing, learn from people. Without
observing the complex project dynamics, critical information necessary for profound
understanding could be missed. Developing without observation implies: I am hoping I am
clever, I am hoping I am smart, I am hoping I am insightful knowing a priori the critical issues.
Developing solutions based on hope is a risky endeavor. By observing, one is less hopeful and
clever by being wise; let the environment tell us the issues.
This type of research technique is especially helpful in tracing complex activities and processes
as well as detecting new, emerging "trends". Ethnographers make key inferences from three
sources: from what people say, from the way people act and from the artifacts people use43 . The
goals of the ethnographic research were threefold:
* Validate scope and problem frame: Our observation strategy set out to investigate the
problem scope. Challenges were discussed, where to start looking and our critical anchor
features. Analyzed high level issues: create initial criteria/assumptions to test by
observation.
* Discovery of key criteria: discover additional criteria - new observed information.
Categorized into three "levels": SHAZAAM (this is an epiphany), Wow! (excitement)
and interesting.
* Embodiment: As our research and observation bore onward, the author attempted to
understand the "what," or in other words, the embodiment: develop a vocabulary to speak
with the subjects, develop what the issue might look like (mental models, visual aids), the
operating environment, current perceptions.
The author was a member of project team consisting of a joint effort combining the efforts of
industry teams (contractors) and government management. The author had direct exposure to all
43 Spradley, James P. Ethnographic Interview. Wadsworth Publishing. 1979
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industry personnel: program management, team leads/mangers and to the individual engineers
assigned to specific subsystems. Direct exposure to all the weekly activities, organizational
behavior dynamics, the schedule and progress was a critical component to the research effort. In
addition, the author had the same direct exposure to the customer, the government leadership.
To investigate the issues raised from the ethnographic research, several interviewing techniques
are available: Laddering (Gutman 1982) 44 , Benefit Chains (Morgan 1984) 45 and Echo techniques
(Barthol/Bridge 1968) 46 . In addition, there are several different applications (including the above
models) of interviewing including but not limited to focus groups, 1:1 interviews, and 2-3
customers. The author used a combination of interviews following the Zaltman Metaphor
Elicitation Technique (ZMET) 47 and in-depth semi-structured interviews.
Human knowledge of issue or needs lies deeply embedded in our brains rarely surfacing.
Unfortunately, our native tongue is powerless to coax it out of its mental hiding. People are
more comfortable expressing themselves through images 48. The interview tools previously
mentioned are tools using words, relying on surveys, questionnaires and focus groups. With the
emphasis on word, these tools are limiting. Rather better techniques to get at our hidden
knowledge are required to: tap nonverbal reactions, probe below the surface for deeper feelings
and resonate with the subject on an emotional level49. The author needed to get at information
the subjects don't know that they know. The solution is a metaphor. In ZMET, images are
metaphors for thought50
44 Gutman, Jonathan (1982), "A means-End Chain Model Based on Consumer Categorization Processes", Journal of
Marketing, 46 (Spring), 60-72
45 Morgan, Anthony I. (1984) "Point of View: Magic Town Revisited (A Personal Perspective),"
Journal of Advertising Research, 24, 4 (August/September), 49-51
46 Barthol, R. P and R. G. Bridge. (1976), "The Echo Multi-Response Methods for Surveying Value and Influence
Patterns in Groups," Psychological Reports, 22, 1345-1354.
47 Christensen, G and J. Olsen. (2002) "Mapping Consumers' Mental Models with ZMET", Psychology &
Marketing, Vol 19(6)477-503 (June 2002)
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ZMET is a technique for eliciting constructs that influence our thought and behavior 51. The goal
is simple: to uncover the mental models that guide behavior by eliciting real-life from subjects
about how they behave and what they truly feel 52 . ZMET is a hybrid methodology that employs
a broad framework rather than a single method53. The framework integrates the visual
projection technique, in-depth personal interview and a range of qualitative data processing
techniques such as categorization, abstraction of categories, comparisons of instance of data and
dimensionalisation of the data54
Finally, backing up all of the research methods are metrics. Metrics include leading progress
indicators of schedules, EVMS 55 and traditional test results. The metrics used are measured
results.
Chapter 6 Application of Methods
Section 6.1.1 Initial Steps
The research plan was iterative and incremental. During the early investigation, only an
emerging trend or poor performance as exhibited by significant schedule delay directed the
research plan. The initial steps of the research were to define the research problem in broad
terms. The research effort began by defining several mental models of the current environment:
productivity, integration progress, knowledge on the program, effectiveness of incentive and
experience. These mental models where collected from observation and an informal, semi-
structured interview process of key leadership/stakeholder positions.
51 Christensen, G and J. Olsen. (2002) "Mapping Consumers' Mental Models with ZMET", Psychology &
Marketing, Vol 19(6)477-503 (June 2002)
52 Ibid, p499
53 Lee, M et al. "Using ZMET to explore barriers to the adoption of 3G mobile banking services". International
Journal of Retail & Distribbution Management; 2003; 31 6/7, p 340-8
54 Spiggle, S. "Analysis and interpretation of qualitative data in consumer research", Journal of Consumer Research,
VOL 21, December 1994, pp 491-503
55 ANSI/EIA-748-1998, Earned Value Management Systems
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Table 1: Mental Models
Interesting, everything seemed to be negative! The project was neither producing nor integrating
what we produced. Worse, our knowledge and experience (as measured by both skill level and
work rate) gained on the project was eroding. The "Award Fee" was not having the intended
effect in changing contractor behavior.
Next, an analysis of collected metrics of program performance initiated including both the
financial data though monthly reported Earned Valued Management System (EVMS) 56 and
software progress metrics.
56 ANSI/EIA-748-1998, Earned Value Management Systems
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Figure 111-3 S/W Integration Progress Inchworm
As visualized, EVMS data clearly shows a poor performance; in fact, the program was over
budget. Worse, the program was over budget with very little progress to show for the 
money
sunk into the program.
Over budget, under performing with lack of progress towards measured (non subjective) objects,
schedule over runs, performance and quality issues - sounds very familiar! These problems
persist despite best efforts and "blue ribbon" initiatives to address these identified issues. These
deficiencies are the norm for software intensive systems even with significant advance in
systems and software engineering techniques, tools and process. Why do these problems
continue to exist?
Section 6.1.2 Stakeholder Analysis
The next critical parameter is determination of the number of subjects. Qualitative research
methods rely on a small base, high quality subject. The true measure of subject number is the
36
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resulting confidence that you have interviewed enough customers to reveal the most applicable
issues. Therefore, research focused on quality and depth within a small user population in lieu of
broader based interviews with a larger population. Based on the Griffin and Hauser (1993)57,
interviewing 20 customers identifies 90% of the needs provided by 30 customers. These authors
also indicate that interviewing 2-12 customer's is optimistic, with anything over 12 a good fit
(identifying customer need/issue). Dr. West 58 presented statistics showing that 7 customers
should reveal the benefits required by the majority of the users. In general, if the phenomena are
important to many people, a segment of seven to ten subjects will uncover 80% of the issues.
Initially, a segment size of twelve was identified. Due to scheduling issues and time pressures,
only eight interviews were conducted. Five interviews were face-to-face, 1:1 interviews,
recorded and transcribed. These five subjects represented key stakeholders from SPO leadership
(the customer). Due to privacy issues, three interviews were not recorded. These unrecorded
interviews represented key contractor management positions. These three interviews were
scheduled as the last three interviews and were largely used to validate the key findings from the
recorded five. None of the final three interviews revealed any new issues.
Section 6.1.3 Crafting an Instrument
ZMET
At its core, ZMET is based on concepts derived from mental images as selected by the subject.
ZMET stresses the role metaphors play in learning and communicating. Most people are more
comfortable expressing themselves through visual images than words. Using photographs to
represent their thoughts has been well documented (Zaltman and Coulter 199559, Zaltman
199760, and Denzin 198961).
57 Griffin, A. and J. Hauser. "Voice of the Customer." Marketing Science, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1993) 1-27. The
article is focused on NEEDS with respect to a product development effort. We have extrapolated the same
contextual data for defining "pain" or issues.
58 Dr. Harry West, Guest Lecturer, MIT, Product Design and Development ESD.40, September, 2006
59 Zaltman G. and R. Coulter. "Seeing the voice of the customer: metaphor based advertising research", Journal of
Advertising Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, July/August, pp 25-51
60 Zaltman G. "Rethinking market research: putting people back in", Journal of Marketing Research, November, pp
424--35
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The ZMET research instrument followed the following process -:
1. Initial Framing/Seed Question: acts as a foundation for the visual response.
2. Visual Response: Draws metaphors out of the subjects by asking them to spend a few
weeks (2 weeks in our case) thinking about how they would visually represent their
experience.
3. Interviews: Spend a few hours telling stories about all of the images they chose and the
connections between them. Use pictures as visual clues to trigger associations, anecdotes
or explanations
4. Collage: Construct a summary collage from the interview
In-Depth Interview Questionnaire and Protocol
With the ZMET instrument defined, focus turned to the interview protocol and questionnaire
instrument (post ZMET). Once the ZMET portion of the interview completed, the research
effort focused on an in-depth interview process. The process followed the following steps:
1. Greeting and Explanation: Covers the ground rules of the interview. Its purpose and
who authorized it, how the recording will be handled. Details of how subject was
selected, how the information will be used and why information is important - there are
no wrong answers.
2. Opening: Build rapport. Start with interesting easy questions that require some
elaboration - description and experiential in nature.
3. Central Part: Where most of the work gets done. Here probe tenaciously with
descriptive probes leveraging back to ZMET if required. Probes for content.
4. Closing: Hand over reins to subject - the subject is the research collaborator. Looking
for anything missed that is important to the subject.
The starting point was to seed the questioning with the information collected from the
observation phase in combination with the metrics collected. The goal was a series of questions
designed to allow the interviewee to "open up". General questions were devised and a loose
61 Denzin, N. K. The Research Act: A theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. 3 rd ed., Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1989
62 Both the framing question and interview protocol are documented in questionnaire appendix.
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schedule of questions mapped. The questions formed a based document called the questionnaire
guide.
In general, the interviews were planned to last on average about 2 hours. Interview length was
based on three criteria: how well engaged the potential subject, the synergy in the problem space,
and finally if a previous relationship existed. In addition, whenever possible, all interviews were
recorded. The subjects did not receive any compensation for their time spent as a subject.
Our questionnaire was an evolving, fluid document. As our interviews bore onwards, we
recorded new "issues" previously unknown or missed associations actively learned. By taking
advantage of serendipitous findings, emerging insight can be recorded and further tested. The
questionnaire was modified with these new issues and associations. Additionally, prior to any
interview completion, the author requested follow-on contact to further sanitize other subject
issues (not mentioned by the actively interview person).
Interview Results
All recorded interviews were transcribed into a word document. The raw transcriptions seeded
the data analysis phase.
Chapter 7 Analysis
Data analysis started with traditional methods for induction (Miles and Huberman 198463). The
author reviewed all photographs, interview transcriptions, notes from interviews and collected
metrics. Evidence from each transcription, the author melded all the sources into detailed
interview cases. Across all cases, the author constructed a summary collage (see appendix). All
interviewers were given their respective "case" vignettes with augmented information to be
reviewed for accuracy. Once approved by the subject, the detailed case transcription was not
allowed modification.
63 Miles, M. and A. Huberman. Qualitative Data Analysis. Newbury Park, Ca. Sage.
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Interview scripts were quite large. As the author re-read the augmented documents, a case
outline was generated picking out the key information from each interview. Several benefits
have been realized from the mini-case outlines:
* Case write ups were central to the generation of insight
* Cases helped in coping with the large volumes of data (especially early in the process)
* Allowed the author to become familiar with each case as a standalone entity
* Allows for unique case patterns to emerge before generalizing across multiple cases
Humans are poor processors of information. Biases, whether explicit or implicit, almost
certainly find their way into analysis. Bias can results from any number of unexplained reasons
including but not limited to incentives of the researcher, influence by the vividness of the data,
leaping to conclusions based on limited data or worse dropping conflicting information. This
can result in an investigator reaching premature or even incorrect conclusions. To overcome
these deficiencies, the author leveraged several techniques to force analysis beyond initial
impressions. Specifically, the outlined cases from each interview were analyzed across each
other creating a composite case. The author looked for similarities and differences among the
cases. This view represents the composite outline case. This composite case outline was used to
not only provide a description 64 but to generate65 and eventually test a hypothesis 66.
Our analysis processes followed an incremental and iterative approach (see Glauser and
Strauss 67). In some cases, data collection and data analysis overlapped. This happened in
several cases where serendipitous findings were discovered late in the interview process. Prior
subjects were contacted for brief "mini" interviews investigating the new insight. These
conversations were not recorded. There are several motivating benefits for this approach:
* Gives the researcher a head start in the analysis
* Allows researchers to take advantage of flexible data collection mechanism
* Freedom to make adjustments
* Data might unexpectedly turn interesting.
64 Kidder, T. Soul of a Machine. New York: Avon
65 Gersick, C. "Time and transition in work teams: Toward a new model of group development." Academy of
Management Journal, 1988 31, 9-41
66 Pinfield, L. Organizations and organization theory. 1982, Marshfield, Ma.: Pitman
67 Glauser, B. and A. Strauss The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research. Chicago, Aldine.
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This additional flexibility "is not a license to be un-systematic; rather this flexibility is controlled
opportunism." 68 This flexibility manifested itself in two ways. First, it was built into the very
research instruments used during the interview process allowing the author to probe emergent
themes. Secondly field notes created a "running" commentary combined with post interview
analysis (on transcripts) to push thinking by noting future questions to ask (serendipitous
findings). This is particularly germane in the case of new learning and how this differed from
previous interviews.
From this analysis, cross reference tactics and overall impressions, themes, concepts and
relationships between identified variables began to emerge. In addition to identifying the
variables, mental models also emerged describing the variables. Together, these two formed the
basis for patterns of interest. These patterns of interest were systematically compared with
evidence from each case. An assessment was made on how well or poorly it fit with the case
data.
To generate a dynamic explanation for the evolving relationship between variables, causal loop
diagramming 69 from system dynamics was leveraged. The author developed causal loop
diagrams describing particular episodes - or "mini" causal loops. As our knowledge
accumulated, the author further integrated episode specific diagrams into a unified framework to
address the problem. Causal diagramming has a rich history in organizational studies and
provides a convenient and precise technology for articulating process theories 70. By using this
method, targeted at the identified variables from both the mini-cases as well as composite case,
the resultant causal loop is tightly integrated and internally consistent with the interactions
leading to the incredible success followed by the incredible collapse.
68 Eisenhardt, K. "Building Theories from Case Study Research", Academy of Management Review, 1989, Vol 14,
No. 4, 532-550
69 Sterman, J. D. Business dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex world. Boston: Irwin/McGraw-
Hill 200070 Perlow, L., G. Okhuysen and N. Repenning. "The Speed Trap: Exploring the Relationship Between Decision
Making and Temporal Conext", Academy of Management Journal, 2002, Vol 45, No. 5, 931-955
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Like all methods, there are limits to this approach. By using collected, measured metrics in
conjunction with the causal loop diagramming, the author is able investigate the interactions
manifested in this problem. However, the ethnographic nature our research limits the
generalization of our findings. The utility of this approach "lies not in the direct transferability
of our findings, but in the ability to produce grounded theory that could not be identified with a
broader-brush data collection method." 7 1




Our research augments the work of punctuated change with an archetype approach 72 to
understand the strategic orientation of the organization. Unlike the prescribed approach, this
approach leverages the following techniques:
* Holistic: Organizational structures and management systems are best understood in terms
of overall patterns 73 rather than by analysis of narrowly drawn sets of organizational
properties.74
* Interpretive Schemes 75: organizational patterns are provided by ideas, values and beliefs
embodied within structure and systems. 7
By following the archetype approach, our research aims at identifying and interpreting overall
patterns of organizational orientation among key design variables. As visualized in the
innovation triangle, our variables include New Business Development, Corporate Skill Mix and
Project Management. By taking a broad research approach, we limit the effects of the
"Parist" 77,78 bias. According to Miller, the "Parist" approach selects limited numbers or
organizational variables which are analyzed in a discrete fashion. Our approach to eliminating
this bias was not to include all variables, rather, a careful selection of variables chosen to be
consistent with the archetype modeled in a continuous system dynamics model. By focusing on a
general set of possible variables rather than narrow set, our research attempted to avoid isolating
possible patterns causing the poor organization performance.
After reviewing the cumulative case, several insights were discovered:
1. Complex Corporate Skill Mix
2. An Innovation Triangle exists coupling a company's
a. Innovation Strategy
b. Corporate Skill Mix
c. Product Development Capability
3. A company's innovation strategy directly effects the success (or failure) of its project
pipeline
72 Hinings, Royston and Greenword. The Dynamics of Strategic Change. Basil Blackwell Ltd. Oxford, UK
73 Miller, D. and P Friesen. Organizations: A Quantum View. New York: Prentice Hall. 1984
74 HIinings, p.7
75 Ransom, S. et al. "The Structure of organizational structures." Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 1-17. 1980
76 I[inings, p. 7
77 Miller D. "Towards a new contingency approach: the search for organization gesalts." Journal of Mangement
Studies, 18: 1-26.
78 HEinings, p. 9
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Chapter 8 Team Definitions
Central to the model is the notion that corporate resources (engineers) are not all alike. The mix
of skills in any corporation is dynamic. For this thesis, this concept is identified as the A/B
teaming skill mix (or teaming). Some employees have a commitment, passion and excellence
few others exhibit. The 'A' player represents this small, precious corporate resource.
Research clearly defines three (3) key skill attributes in determining a person's "type":
* Technical Ability: "raw" technical, cognitive ability. The go to technical expert who
solves problems when the chips are down. The corporate gatekeepers 79
* Leadership Ability: Mobilizing people to face adaptive changes 8s. It requires other
people to take on responsibility; pushing work back into the organization and getting
people to do the work only they can do.
* Foresight: ability to scan the "project" horizon looking for trouble and detecting the
icebergs. More importantly is to understand and interpret how things should unfold and
making the necessary, easy corrects at the earliest opportunity
No single type alone makes an 'A' player. It is a blend of all three attributes with proven
experience that determines status. Research data clearly defines experience with both leadership
and technical ability as the first order differentiator. In each case, all analysis reveals the need to
exceed the notion of expert. Expert level is different for each attribute. Additional insight from
research dictates a notion of time. Here time refers to two (2) subtle aspects. First, time it takes
to understand to the physics of the technology as well as time required to become a solid leader.
Secondly, there is a notion of longevity with the company. Longevity of the company is
weighted hire (by reference count across interviews). Navigating the modem day, cross matrix
organization is a complex activity. Success is solely based on how long you have been with the
company dictating who you know in the company.
79 Allen, T. Managing the Flow of Information. MIT Press Cambridge Ma, 1977 Here the author presents the role
of the corporate gatekeepers.
80 Heifetz, Ronald and Laurie, Donald. "The Work of Leadership", Harvard Business Review; Dec2001, Vol. 79
Issue 11, p1 3 1-141 and Heifetz, R. (1994). Leadership Without Easy Answers. Belknap/Harvard, 1994
45








Figure IV-2 Key Attributes of Personnel
Leadership and Technical Ability
Leadership was further defined with the following attributes:
* Identifying Adaptive Challenge
* Regulating Distress
* Maintaining Disciplined attention
* Giving work back to people
* Protecting "voices of leadership" from below
Research also indicates there is a big difference between leadership and management.
Leadership has a notion of vision - laying out the strategy "kind of the forward looking stuff' 81
- proactive, steering the project. A person who is a manager - "fix the problem kind of guy" - is
more day to day, reactive task master.
Cognitive ability and team effectiveness are directed connected. Considerable evidence supports
the notion that cognitive ability shapes team effectiveness. The intelligence of team members has
been show to predict team effectiveness8 2,8 3, team learning84, and cases of unfamiliar tasks85
81 Pettyjohn, Eric. From qualitative interview. See p7 of Pettyjohn interview.
82 LePine, J. A. (2005). Adaptation of teams in response to unforeseen change: Effects of goal difficulty and team
composition in terms of cognitive ability and goal orientation. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 90, 1153-1167.
83 Neuman, G. A., Wagner, S. H., & Christiansen, N. D. (1999). The relationship between work team personality
composition and the job performance of teams. Group & Organization Management, 24, 28-45.
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Furthermore, team's use of cognitive ability is based on two criteria: task requirements and
member abilities are clearly defined86. If a solution is required, members will quickly identify
who has the necessary skill set to complete the job.
Unfortunately, for analytical work, neither task requirements nor member abilities are clear.
Operating in this environment requires collaborative planning. Collaborative planning helps
teams to deal with ambiguity. Collaborative planning helps team members identify capabilities
within the group. Knowing this information helps the team to leverage these skills necessary for
team success. Collaborative planning gives team members the opportunity to "converse about
their work strategy for enhanced team performance only when members had been assigned roles
that were incongruent with their abilities." 87 Conversely, collaboration did not help when task
and ability are closely aligned. Rather, in this condition, collaboration impedes "performance
when critical expertise was not on the team."88 As such, research indicates "interaction of team
ability and collaborative planning more strongly predicts performance than team ability alone." 89
Scanning Horizon - Foresight
Foresight was further delineated with the following characteristics:
* Strategic - vision/mission
* Internal "test result" generator
* Metronome
Foresight is a specific skill only of the 'A' player. Foresight has a strategic element. Here the
'A' player can see a problem "1 mile off' 90 . The leader can see a problem six months out and
put minor corrections to avoid the issue - a very proactive approach.
84 Ellis, A. P. J et. al (2003). Team Learning: Collectively connecting the dots. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 88,
821-835.
85 Devine, D. J., & Philips, J. L. (2001). Do smarter teams do better: A meta-analysis of cognitive ability and team
performance. Small Group Research, 32, 503-528.
Faraj, S., & Sproull, L. (2000). Coordinating expertise in software development teams. Management Science, 46,
1554-1568.
87 Hackman, p 7.
88 Hackman, p.7
89 Hackman, p. 7
90 Ibid p8.
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"It's huge. Because, I mean, it's like - it's like driving a ship. You see
something a mile off and you make a one degree correction, you can miss
it by 100 fOet. If you see something 100 yards offu now you've got to make
an 800 correction."
To juxtapose, without this proactive approach, a "would be" leader is reactionary ('B' rating). In
reaction mode (80' correction), I have to throw a lot of resources (people and money) at the
problem. Schedules may have to slip in order to get around the problem. Worst case scenario,
the project has stalled, dead in the water, until this problem is resolved. Secondly, strategy also
has a sense of vision and mission in shaping the culture of the team.
On a technical slate, foresight allows the 'A' player to generate "accurate" or near accurate test
results. This is achieved with the significant experience and expertise in a given technology.
The 'A' player has proven "design patterns" or mini architecture that can be analyzed in real
time to produce results. These internal results "validate" progress or highlight deficiencies.
There is a notion of a metronome- a project rhythm - an internal clock tracking the project timing
and success to date. This internal clock is a sanity check: "if we are not here by X, we are in
trouble."
The last notion of foresight is time horizon. How far into the future measured in order effects.
'A' players can see issue far before they come to fruition. In addition, they can analyze to
accurate measures the 2nd, 3rd, and 4 th order effects their decisions have not only of the project
but the team as well.
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Time Horizon
2 nd, 3 rd, 4 th Order Vision
A,_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
Figure IV-3 Time Horizon
These "order effects" are best visualized in the above figure. On the top is the 'A' player -
scanning the horizon, making the easy, one degree evolutionary effects. Without this skill,
vision or horizon scanning turns into hindsight. It is not until poor performance of the project
does an analysis take place. Unfortunately, the event has already taken place.
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A Team
Figure IV-4 George Washington Crossing the Delaware
Qualitative research uses George Washington crossing the Delaware River as the mental model
of the 'A' player. Brilliant leadership, raw cognitive ability and distance horizon scanning
91 is a
single, expensive package. The 'A' player is not cheap by any means.
91 Manning, Jeff. Summary collage of qualitative research. See appendix xxx
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Figure IV-5 'A' Horizon Scanning
The 'A' player knows his environment, knows where to be to maximize success and to avoid
failure. Essentially, the 'A" player is the total package. Unfortunately, there are very few
George Washington's. Research has shown the 'A' player is a scarce resource. Often is the case
in which the demands of the projects in the pipeline outstrip an organization's total capacity. As
such, companies leverage this precious resource very carefully.
Research has indicated there is a "sweet spot" for maximizing the effectiveness of the 'A' player
for a company. For the purposes of this research, the product life cycle is a staged gate, waterfall
model with four stages: requirement, architecture/design, implementation (and unit test) and
integration testing.92 Our research has shown that the 'A' player with their significant
experience is maximized in the early stages of the product life cycle (requirement and
architecture). The "sweet spot" of influence is dictated in coordination with a validated and
accepted design. During implementation and integration test, the 'A' player plays little role
other than the possible, periodic request for clarification.
This is visualized in the following figure:
92 Ulrich, K. and S. Eppinger. Prodcut Design and Development. 3 rd Edition. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2004
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Figure IV-6 "A" Member Effectiveness
As visualized in all figures, there is an effectiveness point beyond which the effectiveness of the
'A' player is not a significant source of influence or competitive advantage. This is clearly
shown in the (c) where the 'A' player is maximizing their influence and benefit to company and
(d) figure where the 'A' player does not provide a significant source of influence on a project.
Again the point in time where the Effectiveness curve crosses the critical threshold is at the
validated design (more on this later).
Additionally, from a revenue generating perspective, there is a possibility of lost opportunity (see
figure (a)). During the project periods of significant influence, the 'A' player is shaping the
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architecture and team dynamics for successful project implementation. Once properly
transitioned to the implementation team, effectiveness begins to erode (as does the motivation
and moral). Therefore the effectiveness of the 'A' player can be model as an oscillation as
shown in figure (c).
B Team
(a) Stone crusher (b) Stuck in isolation, mud
Figure IV-7 'B' Member Mental Models
Research 93 paints a bleak picture for the 'B' player. In general, 'B' players are perceived as
having less experience and cost. 'B' players run the gambit, but in general are lacking in more
than one attribute. For instance, they can have significant technical expertise but little in the role
of leadership (and vice versa). As shown in the above figure is both the isolation and futility. In
the (c) image, a similar sense of quagmire: cannot go forward, backward, left or right without a
kind act from a fellow 'B'. Even the off-ramp is jammed. This is not a great place.
The next major driver of 'B' status is the lack of foresight. The 'B' player is reactive, day to
day. Get up in the morning to pound rocks, get stalled in the mass commute or stuck in the mud
of a dead end endeavor.
93 Krawczyk, Peter. ZMET images from the qualitative 1:1 in-depth interview. See appendix XXX
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Figure IV-8 'B' Member Horizon Scanning
As shown, 'B' has difficulty peering into the future unable to see the 2nd, 3rd or 4 th order effects
of their actions. They see problems only 100 yards away or worse. They make a decision and
run until a roadblock then look to the past to see what caused their current situation. They
cannot see "results" ahead of time only the poor performance of their prior decisions. This delay
is a source of penalty. This mode of operation creates the "boiling frog" dynamic.
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Chapter 9 Innovation Triangle
Section 9.1New Business Generation
Whether we like it or not organizations are political machines. It is the expressed goal to sustain
and even advance your claim to scarce resources 94. This creates patterns of advantage and
disadvantage in today's corporations. These advantages and disadvantages are sustained by the
organizational structures (arrangements) which support them. These "arrangements" become
regarded as norm - constructing a corporate culture. Therefore the few selected "privileged"
projects maintain their status and interests by denying "structural" change maintaining the status
quo. Any reorientation is difficult requiring significant pain of crisis to alter.95 Crisis is
generated by two forces: poor performance and or a disrupting force (market or technology for
example).
One very obvious pattern creating advantage for any company is new business development.
Without new business there is no growth. Research revealed the 'A' team members play a
critical role in the development of new business. New business development is a highly
technical job requiring the ability to evangelize corporate technology but to shape senior
customer leadership thought processes. It requires years of technical and leadership experience
94 Henings, p. 21
95 Henings, p. 21
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with exposure to the protocols governing new business with the government. There is a very
strong force to keep the pool of available 'A' players large to aid in the generation of new
business.
Research has also revealed the need for the 'A' player to provide technical expertise and
leadership in the delivery of the earned project. It is a wide held belief that an 'A' player's
impact of project completion is during the early project deliveries. Their impact is greatly
reduced during the large time spent implementing the architecture/design.
I ,
ItI
Figure IV-9 New Business Generation
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Logically, to promote growth, the 'A' player is a significant asset. For successful project
implementation, the 'A' player is also a significant driver. Senior leadership faces a dilemma -
competing and conflicting drivers for the critical 'A' player resource. Corporate leaders must
create a strategy balancing the needs of delivering success programs and creating new business.
Section 9.2 Innovation Strategy
Thesis research and follow on analysis revealed a key mental model and organizational
archetype. Initially, project team composition is laden with 'A' players, followed by a transition
period including a team laden with both 'A' and 'B' players and ending up in a squeeze profit
mode with teams saddled largely with 'B' players. There are three key drivers to this
philosophy:
* Cut vs. Kill Dynamics: In the early stages of a program's life cycle, it is easier to cut a
project than to kill it (after it has been approved). Any time before the program has been
"approved"; a project can be terminated with very little effort.
* Make it right: During this cut dynamics period, the bidding process needs its best talent
(both cognitive ability and leadership) to get the program to the fully funded stage. It is a
show of strength and commitment.
* Build performance credibility: During this "make-it-right" stage, the team builds
credibility and momentum of performance and success. Early success is a significant
factor (among many) to project approval.
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As visualized, the "make-it-right" phase is defined as everything to the left of the transition
period while squeeze profits is loosely defined to include everything to the right. For the
purposes of our thesis, the transition phase is defined with respect to the product life cycle. In the
project under analysis, the life cycle was a staged gate effort consisting of four (4) stages:
requirements analysis, architecture and design, implementation and unit test and finally
integration testing. The transition is defined as the point of design validation, the end point of
the design and architecture phase. The transition period begins with the completion of the
design.
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Figure IV-11 Removal Event
With design validated and the funding secure, the 'A' player's effectiveness is believed to
diminish. As visualized, we remove these 'A' players placing them back to the new business
generation. With a proper hand-off and capable engineers, the expected green curve will be
followed. Statistics prove this to be exception rather than the rule. More often than not, the
"actual" curve is followed (results). It is even worse, not only are we following the "actual"
curve, project leadership believe it is still on the "expected" curve. Eventually, poor
performance is detected leading to extensive firefighting or even the possibility of abandonment.
Section 9.3 Project Management 96
The last leg of our innovation triangle is project management. Beyond the scope of the thesis
research, the project management component leverages the seminal work of the rework cycle97.
The key finding of the rework cycle is the concept of rework. Rework is generated in a project
96 Lyneis, J. MIT, System Project Management ESD.36, September, 2006. The Rework Model utilized in this
course builds upon the model Prof. Lyneis used in ESD.36.
97Cooper, K.G. The Rework Cycle (a series of 3 articles): Why Projects Are Mismanaged; How It Really Works ...
And Reworks ... ; Benchmarks for the Project Manager. PMNETwork Magazine, February 1993 for first two
articles; Project Management Journal March 1993 for third article. Additionally, the interested reader can also
reference:
Cooper, K.G. and T. W. Mullen. "Swords and Plowshares: The Rework Cycles of Defense and Commercial
Software Development Projects," American Programmer, May,1993.
Lyneis, James M., Cooper, Kenneth G., and Els, Sharon A., "Strategic Management of Complex Projects: A Case
Study Using System Dynamics." System Dynamics Review 17(3), 237-260.
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and remains largely undiscovered or hidden until later stages of the development cycle. As such
a gap exists between what is believed to be completed (perceived) and the real work
accomplished. The rework cycle focuses on assessing the impacts of factors including but not
limited to work quality, productivity, time to discover rework and work done correctly.
Additionally, the model focuses on management tools including schedule pressure and its impact
on quality, moral and productivity. Our work layers and extends over this work to include the
innovation trap. We extend this model to include the pressures of new business development in
conjunction with the necessary transition policy of a corporation to meet these needs at the
expense of the existing project.
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PART V Analysis of the Innovation Triangle
Chapter 10 System Dynamics
First introduced by Forrester 98, System Dynamics (SD) has emerged as a methodology for
modeling the behavior of complex systems. The SD approach is based on a holistic perspective
modeling real world systems. Grounded in mathematical discipline of control theory, SD is "a
practical tool that policy makers can use to help them solve the pressing problems they confront
in their organizations." 99 Because of this emphasis, SD has been used in many fields and
applications including but not limited to corporate policy, to the study of fisheries and software
development. More importantly, SD allows the modeler to consider different system attributes
or factors such as complexity, quality, time to discover rework and leadership. Several software
application and or packages exist for creating and running System Dynamics models. This study
uses Vensim® software.
Chapter 11 Description of System Dynamics Model
The following system dynamics model is composed of three sections: skill mix, policy and
rework cycle. The first section deals with aspects that affect the internal composition of the team
with respect to our A/B team definitions. The second section addresses aspects that affect the
specific policies affecting the transition and leaning out of the project team. Finally, the third
aspect of the model leverages the seminal rework cycle100 as the core project management
engineer. Appendix A shows detailed definitions and explanations of what each variable
represents and the equations of the model.
98 Forrester (1961) Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge Mass, The M.I.T. Press.
99 Sterman, John , Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modelingfor a Complex World, Irwin/McGraw-Hill,
2000. p. ix.
100 Cooper, K.G. The Rework Cycle (a series of 3 articles): Why Projects Are Mismanaged; How It Really Works
... And Reworks ...; Benchmarks for the Project Manager. PMNETwork Magazine, February 1993 for first two
articles; Project Management Journal March 1993 for third article. Cooper, K.G. and T. W. Mullen. "Swords and
Plowshares: The Rework Cycles of Defense and Commercial Software Development Projects," American
Programmer, May,1993. Lyneis, James M., Cooper, Kenneth G., and Els, Sharon A., "Strategic Management of
Complex Projects: A Case Study Using System Dynamics." System Dynamics Review 17(3), 237-260.
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Figure V-1 Full System Dynamics Model
Section 11.1 Skill Mix
The skill mix flow portion of the model is comprised of two important stocks, which are "B
Team Member" and "A Team Members". Critical endogenous variables are pool of available
"Indicated A Staff' and "Indicated B Staff'. The analysis section will focus on how changes in
these two critical variables affect the stocks in the system as well as the critical variables "Team
Work Rate", "Team Size" and "Team Skill Level". The model maintains several calibration
constants:
* Initial A/B Team Members: Initial seed of team composition.
* A/ B Staff Skill Level: Aids in the overall determination of project quality
* A/B Staff Work Rate: Determines the overall project productivity
* A/B adjustment Times: Determines the amount of time to hire/transfer team members.
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The feedback depicted in this dynamic sub-model is straightforward. At its core, as the team
skill mix is altered by corporate transition and firefighting policy our quality and productivity as
dynamically adjust.
Section 11.2 Policy
Necessary to understand the "Indicated Fraction of A" (IFA), two separate and parallel dynamics
must be understood: "Pressure to Change Fraction of A" (PCFA) and "Product Life Cycle
Adjustment" (PLCA). This section exposes the details of these feedback mechanisms.
Section 11.2.1 Pressure to Change Fraction of A (aka Firefighting)
B: Sisyphus: This is a balancing loop. As "Indicated Management Pressure to Add A" (IMP) is
translated into pressure by "Effect of Pressure. This increases the "Indicated Fraction of A"
increasing the amount of "A Team Members". An increase in "A Team Members" increase
"Team Skill Mix" (quality) and "Team Work Rate" (productivity) reducing the "Work To Do"
by completing more work correctly (via "Quality"), thereby increasing the "Indicated
Completion Rate" to finish schedule and thus reducing the "Indicated Management Pressure to
Add A."
First, PCFA tells management how good (or bad) we are doing to our initial schedule (estimate).
PCFA generates "management pressure" to bring back additional 'A' team members. This
pressure determines whether or not the project has crossed the "poor performance" marker. The
poor performance marker is a point in which without a major staff re-orientation, the project will
not meet its schedule. Research indicates that adding additional "A" staff required executive
decisions. In crossing the poor performance marker, the project is in peril, forcing executive
management to respond with additional 'A' resource.
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The Sisyphus loop adds 'A' players from corporate resources in an iterative and incremental
approach. Due to the nature of the team composition (B players), the issue driving the poor
performance often has occurred in the past.
To translate "Indicated Management Pressure to Add A" (IMP) into action, the model uses a
lookup table: "Effect of Pressure" (EP) such that as our performance deteriorates, we exert
pressure to bring on additional "A" staff to improve our chances of success or at least attempt to
get back on schedule.
Section 11.2.2 Product Life Cycle Adjustment
B: Team Transition: This is a balancing loop. As the "Fraction Perceived to be Complete"
increases throughout the project, using "Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality" (BFAGFQ), we
adjust our "Indicated Fraction of A" (IFA) to a smaller percentage. This change results in a
reduction in the IFA, resulting in a smaller percentage of "Indicated A staff'. "Indicated A
Staff' reduces the "A team Members". A reduced A team reduces both the skill and productivity
of the team. This in turn has the negative effect on both quality and potential work rate. A
decrease in team skill erodes "Quality" and "Feasible Work Rate" which in increases the
"Undiscovered Rework" and "Work Complete Right". But "Work Believed to be Done" still
increases as nothing happens artificially increasing "Fraction Perceived to be Complete".
"Product Life Cycle Adjustment" (PLCA) is responsible for managing the "transition" policy.
As the innovation triangle suggests, there is corporate, executive pressure to return the "A"
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member to new business development. Based on research data, several definitive, endogenous
events occur which trigger transition decisions: design complete and design validation (and
funding). Design complete and Design Validate are project events matching a specific
completion fraction from the "Fraction Perceived to be Complete" (FPC). The FPC is the value
managers believe accurately reflects the fraction of the project complete. Being a staged gate
project, design complete (and design validation) matches a fraction of the total project complete.
Project life cycle completion events are represented in the "Base Fraction of A Given Full
Quality" (BFAGFQ). Key events are at twenty and forty percent complete. Based on research,
twenty percent logically represents the design complete while forty percent represents the design
validation. At design complete we slowly start to degrade our fraction of "A" players. At forty
percent, we accelerate the transition returning "A" players to the new business development.
Section 11.3 Adjusting Team Size
The adjustment of team size is a middle management policy used to improve productivity.
Unlike firefighting, the ability to obtain 'B' level corporate resources does not require executive
level leadership approval. It is assumed project will ebb and flow as time erodes.
Adjusting team dynamics requires one stock, "Work To Do" and the "Current Productivity"
variable. "Work To Do" represents the amount of work outstanding measured in tasks. "Current
Productivity" is our current productivity as measured in task per person month. In our research,
the schedule is fixed to the initial "Schedule Completion Date". We calculate an "Indicated
Completion Rate" required to complete the project on schedule. To convert work rate into staff
resources, we require the current productivity the project is realizing.
B: Improve Pdy: This is a balancing loop. "Time Remaining"(TR) is calculated from the static
variables of "Schedule Completion Date" and "Time". TR feeds into "Indicated Completion
Rate" (ICR) along with "Work To Do" (WTD). ICR determines the amount of work that needs
to be completed in task per month to stay on schedule. "Indicated Total Staff' (ITS) derives the
total staff required given the "Current Productivity" of the team. The ITS staff is proportioned to
A and B staff members based on the "Indicated Fraction of A" (see above loops, held constant in
this loop). ITS has a positive effect on "Indicated B Staff' driving it higher, which in turn
reduces the team skill and work rates. This in turn has the negative effect on both quality and
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potential work rate. A decrease in team skill/work rates erodes "Quality" and "Feasible Work
Rate" which in positively effects the "Undiscovered Rework" and "Work Complete Right".
These causes "Current Productivity" to drop continuing the cycle of B staff build up.
Section 11.4 Rework Cycle
Cooper's seminal rework cycle is the core project management engine. These dynamics are
extended to meet the needs of our Innovation Triangle. There are many complete feedbacks or
causal loops in this model. One is important to understanding the dynamics involved in this
study: R: Errors Build on Errors. A thorough understanding of this loop is critical to
understanding the dynamics involved in the model as values are changed as related to the A/B
teaming policy.
Loop R: Errors Build on Errors: This is a reinforcing loop. "Quality" and "Feasible Work
Rate" determines the amount of "Work Competed Right" as well as "Undiscovered Rework".
These two stocks positively effect "Work Believed to be Done". "Average Work Quality"
(AWQ) uses this perceived work done and creates a ratio to the "Work Completed Right".
Because of the inherent delays in "Rework Discovery Rate" via "Table for Effect of Work
Progress" and "Time to Discover Rework", some work is built upon mistakes (as of yet
undetected). This errors built on errors is calculated by "Effect of Prior Work Quality on
Quality" (EPWQQ). EPWQQ uses AWQ as in index into the "Table for Effect of Prior Work
Quality on Quality" (TEPWQQ). This fraction positively affects "Quality", as the errors build,
the quality is eroded further.
Chapter 12 Analysis of System Dynamics Model (Simulation)
This study will follow an approach of using different scenarios to determine the full range of
implications. A total of six (6) major scenarios are investigated:
1. Successful A Team Only Project Analysis: The model is investigated using a pristine,
theoretical version of an all "A Team Member" approach. The all "A Team Members"
will give a deterministic best case analysis.
2. Successful A/B Team Only Project Analysis: The model is investigated using a
pristine, theoretical version of an A/B Teaming approach. Here, we intrinsically show
that the A/B teaming approach does in fact work when everything is expected.
3. Researched Project Team Analysis: The model is programmed with the research
collected. This analysis will reflect the current DoD program environment. Here the
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project team faced a tighter deadline the prior case. Additional schedule pressure impacts
this test case.
4. Additional Test Insight: Research data revealed one mitigating step in the default
project management processes is to add additional testing with measureable results. This
test case analyzes this condition.
5. Design Flaw Discovered: Design flaws do happen. This test case mirrors the conditions
of an unexpected design flaw discovery. This is modeled by injecting at a pre-specified
month an unexpected increase in tasks. This test case analyzes these conditions.
6. Innovation Strategy Variation: Our analysis will extend the initial concept of A/B
teaming to reflect potential Corporate Skill Mix scenarios as dictated by market research.
Section 12.1.1Simulation Assumptions








Figure V-3 Attribute Map
An important note is the amount of time required to find the relative team members. Based on
market research, "B Team Members" are readily available with a minimum time of a week (.25)
to worst case a month (1). Unfortunately, "A Team Members" are not ranging from a month (1)
to three months (3). As such, the "Time to Adjust Staff' will vary for each sub-team.
The rework cycle requires some initial conditions. First, is to define the Initial Work to Do. The
"Initial Work to Do" represents the total pool of tasks needed to be completed before the project
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can be considered complete. In addition to the number of task, a "Schedule Completion Date"
needs to be defined. "Scheduled Completion Date" represents the amount of time required to
complete the "Initial Work to Do". The "Rework Discovery Rate" can be adjusted. For our
analysis, these values will be held constant until the test results scenario.
Finally, there are several innovation triangle policy variables that can be modified. The two key
variables are lookup tables: "Effect of Pressure" and "Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality".
The effects of these variables will be analyzed in the last section of testing.
This study determines a success project meets (+ 3 months) or beats the schedule. Both
customer and contractor alike consider success in terms of windows. The three month buffer is
based on project research datalol. A failure was considered late by 6 or more months.
Section 12.1.2 Output Analysis
Several custom Vensim ® graphs have been constructed to capture critical feedback variables.
These custom graphs will be used to present the analysis findings.
* Team Graph: Depicts both the A and B Team Sizes
* Work Graph: Depicts the rework cycle "Work Believed to be Done", "Fraction Perceived
to be Complete", "Fraction Really Complete" and "Indicated Completion Rate"
* Quality Pressure: Depicts "Indicated Management Pressure to Add A", "Work
Completed Right", "Indicated A Staff', "Indicated B Staff', "Quality".
Section 12.2 Successful Project Analysis - Optimal Conditions
This test scenario represents the optimal conditions. Team Members are of"A" caliber defining
all team members as both fast in completing 10 tasks and precise in that 95% of the tasks are
completed correctly the first time (top right in our attribute map). The following parameters are
used: "Scheduled Completion Date" is set to 24 months. The following charts show the impact
of leveraging the all A team.
101 Based on in depth research, success was defined in a "window". Specifically, when analyzed across both
customer data and cross checked against the non recorded contractor the following scale was derived:
Success: Meet the schedule +2/3 months. Considered a failure 6 months or greater. Between 3-6 months the
success/failure was mixed, however, most leaned toward failure. For our analysis, we will use schedule + 3 months
as success, anything else is considered a failure.
68





0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
Timh (Monrh)
A Team Members :A Team Only B Team Members :A TeamOnly
Here the project completes on time and requires just over two B player with an initial A team just
over one team member. This figure represents the typical X (transitioning off the "A" members
and transitioning on the "B" members) seen during a transition phase due to design complete and
design validate being met.
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Work Believed to be Done : A Team Only Tasks
Fraction Perceived to be Complete : A Team Only Fraction
Fraction Really Complete : A Team Only ...............------.. -- ... --------------------------------------------- --- ---- Fraction
Indicated Completion Rate :A Team Only Tasks/Month
For the work related effects, the graph shows the strong influence of the skill and work rate of
the A team. All work is done correctly, with only a small decrease in the "Work Believed to Be
Done" based on the rework generation. In looking at the "Fraction Really Complete" (FRC) and
"Fraction Perceived to be Complete" (FPC) we see only minor deviation. Therefore staffing
decisions have essentially mirrored the real conditions.
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There is no quality effect pressure placed on the "Indicated Fraction of A". The project got off
to a strong start and transitioned smoothly and the B team finished off the effort. During the
transition period, quality does indeed dip (from 95% to -80%), yet does not trigger a pressure
effect to increase the size of the A Team Members. Analysis will name this "dip" as the
transition dip.
Section 12.3 Successful A/B Team Only Project Analysis
The model is investigated using a pristine, theoretical version of an A/B Teaming approach.
Here, we intrinsically show that the A/B teaming approach does in fact work when everything is
expected. Typical projects are not blessed with the ability to have all 'A' players (fast and
precise) available for a single project. Project research from in depth interviews reveals the
average "B" team member is "sloppy" but "fast" (top left, attribute map). Management knowing
a prior of the transition pads the schedule. The following parameters are used: "Scheduled
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Completion Date" is set to 48 months. . The following charts show the impact of leveraging the
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Again, we see the trade mark X in transition between the A and B member mix. Here a very
small amount of trouble towards the end of the project, resulting in less than a approximate
month schedule slip (making our success window). The response from the 'B' team growth is
delayed followed by a very sharp increase towards the end (month 36) of the project.
Additionally, we see a small spike in 'A' team personnel (less than one person -. 5 person).
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We did not complete the schedule on time (-1 month schedule slip). "Indicated Completion
Rate" is very slow to respond. Unlike the successful case, "Indicated Completion Rate" lags
behind the work fractions. The main driver of this lag is the increased "Fraction Perceived to be
Complete". In looking at the "Fraction Really Complete" (FRC) and "Fraction Perceived to be
Complete" (FPC) we see only large deviation. Therefore staffing decisions based on the PFC is
starting to adversely affect the team.
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Here we begin to see quality effects on pressure on the "Indicated Fraction of A". The project
got off to a strong start and transitioned smoothly, albeit slowly, and the B team finished off the
effort with some last minute firefighting. During the transition period, quality does indeed dip,
yet does not trigger a pressure effect to increase the size of the A Team Members. The B team
adjustments initially lag behinds the "Indicated Management Pressure to Add A" (IMP), then B
team adjustments quickly accelerate. As the B team staffing rises, we see an increase in IMP
when fully staffed. The project is in jeopardy. In response to this pressure, the analysis reveals
a firefighting scenario, causing an increase in the A staff to try to bring the project back on
schedule. The "A" players are able to deliver on schedule.
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Section 12.4 Researched Project Team Analysis
The model builds off of test case two but is programmed with the research data collected
reflecting the current DoD program environment which sparked this study. Research also
indicated that the software team serving as the basis for this study was composed of B team
members 102 . Here the project team faced a tighter deadline the prior case. The following
parameters are used: "Scheduled Completion Date" is set to 36 months. The following charts
show the impact of leveraging the all A team.
Team
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
Time (Month)
A Team Members: Project Team B Team Members: Project Team ----- .-. . . .
Again, we see the trade mark X in transition between the A and B member mix. Unlike the
successful 'A' player only case, here we run into trouble. The response from the 'B' team growth
is delayed followed by a very sharp increase towards the end (month 36) of the project.
Additionally, we see a small spike in 'A' team personnel. The response indicates that we are in
firefighting mode. In other words, we brought back additional 'A' team members. We missed
schedule by six months.
102 The notion of the B team delivering the project was supported by all research data. Additionally, contractor
interviews (not recorded) also supported this theme.
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What is interesting is that this team mix mirrors the real world observations. The project
finished a year late, with an increase in team mix near the initial completion date. A year later,
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We did not complete the schedule on time (6 month schedule slip). "Indicated Completion Rate"
is very slow to respond. Unlike the successful case, "Indicated Completion Rate" lags behind
the work fractions. The main driver of this lag is the very high "Fraction Perceived to be
Complete". This graph suggests that not only is the project paying the price for the relatively
low quality of the B player, but there is a significant delay in its detection. This suggests a
compound effect. The B player has to "work off' the great initial quality of the 'A' team and
then erode based on his own quality. In looking at the "Fraction Really Complete" (FRC) and
"Fraction Perceived to be Complete" (FPC) we see a large deviation. Therefore staffing
decisions based on the PFC is starting to adversely affect the team. The study labels this "work
off' factor or the additional delay in detecting poor performance as "Residual Goodwill". In
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other words, there is some "grace" time based on past performance. It is not until the project is
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The above assumptions of "working off' the developed 'A' team positive effects (from "Fraction
Perceived to be Complete) are realized. Quite clearly quality dives with the addition of the B
team members. The B team adjustments initially lag behinds the "Indicated Management
Pressure to Add A" (IMP), then B team adjustments quickly accelerate. As the B team staffing
rises, we see an increase in IMP when fully staffed. The project is in jeopardy. In response to
this pressure, the analysis reveals a firefighting scenario, causing an increase in the A staff to try
to bring the project back on schedule. We see the improvement in "Work Completed Right"
with the increase in slope starting in month 36.
Section 12.5 Role of Test Results
There is hope! Lack of vision can be mitigated. Research indicated that a 'B' player's lack of
vision can be offset with the incorporation of frequent testing. By preventing long "black-out"
periods with no real, measurable test results, can greatly improve 'B' player's success.
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Actual Code: real product results
Figure V-4 Test Results
There is an engineering heuristic "test early; test often". By testing early and often, we have
measurable results. This lessons the impact of the 'B' player's poor metronome and "internal"
test generator. There is less dependence because they are placed real test results.
The net effect of "test early; test often" is best summarized by "running a marathon broken up
into 400 meter sprints." 103 By breaking up the marathon into smaller sprints, results are
collected and definitive progress (or lack of progress) is calculated. Corrections can be made.
This incremental and iterative process is shown against the "big bang" approach.
103 Kuschel, Steven Dr. ZMET interview
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Significantly impeded progress
Figure V-5 Incremental vs. Big Bang
The effect of this testing is to try to mitigate the B player's lack of vision but forcing the
"Fraction Perceived to be Complete" to mirror the "Fraction Really Complete". To test early is
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controlled by the lookup table "Table for Effect of Work Progress" and the "Max Time to
Discovery Rework".
Figure V-6 Table for Effect of Work Progress
As shown, this test case analysis switches from the blue (normal case for all prior scenarios) to
the olive line of the earlier discovery capability. Additionally, we alter the "Max Time to
Discover Rework" to a value of 3 months.
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Analysis of the graph produces very positive results. By testing early and often, in fact the two
work fractions are essential identical (work graph). As such, even with the transition effects on
quality, the project team was able to deliver the project essentially on time (-37 months). The
major driver of performance recovery is the almost identical measures of FRC and the PFC. Test
results reduce the gap between the two variables. We are making staffing decisions with accurate
information.
Section 12.6 Design Flaw Discovered
Design flaws do happen; in fact more often than any one will admit. Design flaws are expensive
in terms of both impact and cost to schedule and place additional unexpected pressure on
projects. This test case mirrors the conditions of an unexpected design flaw discovery. This is
modeled by injecting at a pre-specified month an unexpected increase in tasks to complete. The
case assumptions revert back to Researched Project Team Analysis. The shock is controlled by
the following parameters:
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* "Shock Time" - The time (in months) when the "Shock Impact" is inserted into the
"Work To Do" stock. Set to 24 months
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Again, the addition of unexpected rework has caused another slip in the schedule. We can see
the obvious impact at the 24 th month and injects 100 additional tasks. The A/B teaming
immediately responds to the design flaw solves the issues. The B team once again takes over, by
makes very little progress requiring another late firefighting episode. Even with two distinct
firefighting efforts, the project team missed the schedule. This test scenario shows the largest
gap between RFC and PFC.
Section 12.7 Summary
The A/B teaming strategy can work. In fact, if everything goes as expected this strategy does
well in the sense we have freed up or expensive "A" resources for new business development
and that we are able to make higher profit margins using cheaper, less skilled engineers (B team).
If the B team does run into trouble, we can quickly bring back the "A" and still make schedule.
But, we do see the staffing effects of the removal of the 'A' team members. What is interesting
is the "lost year" occurs early in the program between months 12-24. The "B" requires some
time to erode the "good will" developed by the "A" team. Here we are relatively flat, working
under false pretenses. The B team is basking in the early progress of the 'A' team good will. It
is not until the quality setup by the 'A' team erodes that a response is seen. It is a quick and
sudden collapse. The response is a swift growth of not only B team members, but we also see a
spike in the 'A' team. Firefighting is occurring.
Yet, most managers have some reason to expect the unexpected. This is where the A/B teaming
strategy struggles. The strategy fails to deliver on time with increasing schedule pressure (test
case 3) or increasing performance pressure through a design flaw (test case 5). There is some
hope. Research indicates with the advent of more rigorous and disciplines test strategy, the
impact of the B team can be mitigated. This is a direct result of objective, repeatable, systematic
test results which drastically narrows the "Fraction Perceived to be Complete" and "Fraction
Really Complete"
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Section 12.8 Handoff Analysis
Leaving the skill and work rate analysis alone, it is time to shift gears to determine the effects of
altering the product life cycle pressures. One possible risk mitigation strategy is to alter the
transition period to keep the 'A' players on the project longer. Although there is strong incentive










eam Mix of Skills
off Analysis
Currently, the analysis is centered on the above approach for the "Base Fraction of A Given Full
Quality" (BFAGFQ).
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Design 1. Design Validated2. Funding Secure
Figure V-8 Transition Parameters
There is an attempt to "hand-off' from the A team members to the B team members shaded in
green. As shown, there are two parameters affecting the transition period: overlap in skill mix
(team composition axis) as well as an overlap in time (time axis). As visualized, we will analyze
the impact of modifying the transition period to retain our 'A' team members in two distinct
cases:
* Delayed Removal: In the delayed removal, we are simulating a unified A/B team.
Simulation increases our overlap in skill mix by defining the Design Complete indication
earlier in time. This has the effect of bringing on additional B staff earlier in the product
life cycle to improve learning. In addition, we delay the design validation which
increases the overlap in time between the "A" player and the "B" player. The "A" players
will remain on the team for a longer period of time to handle any "tricky" issues that
might pop up (unknown unknowns).
* Quick Removal: For completeness, we test the early overlap and sharp removal of the
"A" team. This is equivalent to the "throw it over the fence" operation mode. Once the
design is validated, just toss it over the fence with little interaction with the downstream
implementation team.
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Figure V-9 Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality
The above figure compares the two approaches with the base case.
Section 12.8.1 Delayed Removal - The Unified Team Approach
In the delayed removal, we are simulating a unified A/B team: not quite the optimal team (as in
test case one) but better than the project team (as in test case 3). Simulation increases our overlap
in skill mix by defining the Design Complete indication earlier. In addition, we delay the design
validation which increases the overlap in time between the "A" player and the "B" player. The
"A" players will remain on the team for a longer period of time to handle any "tricky" issues that
might pop up (unknown unknowns).
Necessary to analyze the effects of the transition, we need to modify the BFAGFQ (see above
figure). If we define the transition periods earlier (design complete) and transition the team more
slowly (design validation), deeper into implementation can we help the schedule erosion? The
following graphs represent the modified BFAGFQ.
88
















IL I" 10 LI Z' I I i 31 1 4 1 4 1 5 7 6
S Iz 15 18 L1 24 2/ 3U 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
Time (Month)
A Team Members :Slow PDD



















D' ^""" I"^l " I""lle•2 |w •




















9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
Tine (Month)
39 42 45 48 51 54
o be CoMplet : Slow PDD
Tasks/Month
quality pressure
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42
Tine (Month)
45 48 51 54 57 60
Peopleff: Slow PDD
ment Presswe to Add A : Slow PDD
Fraction
ad Riht: Sbw PDD
o Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
3 6




.......... .... .. A.....
... I






























........... ... ....... ............ ... ................. ... .... ..................... i . . . ......................... ..... .. ..............











n Rale: Slow 
PDD










As the graphs indicate, there is some change from the prior failed project team (test case three).
The project completes a three months later, seeing better performance. This is large part is
because the team composition in beginning to look more like the optimal team strategy (test case
one).
Section 12.8.2 Quick Removal - "Throw It Over The Fence"
For completeness, we test the early overlap and sharp removal of the "A" team. This is
equivalent to the "throw it over the fence" operation mode. Once the design is validated, just
toss it over the fence with little interaction with the downstream implementation team. The
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In this case, the project team performs very poorly, delaying the project for an entire year. The
team transition "X" is very quick and there exists a large between FRC and PFC. This behavior
should be avoided at all costs.
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PART VI Conclusion
We have modeled and studied an organizational plan, A/B Teaming Strategy, of slowly reducing
strong leadership and technical ability off of existing, pipeline projects leaving the "B" team to
bring home the victory! In other words, we reference the sport's analogy, the first stringers are
up by forty points in the third, put in the second stringers, there in no way we can lose. Besides
if it gets close at the end, we will just bring back the first stringers. Through our analysis, given
pristine lab conditions, modeled "B" teams were able to execute to plan and deliver the project
on schedule (see second simulation). In other words, the A/B teaming strategy to deal with
conflicting corporate goals of new business development and squeezing projects for margin
works as expected - assuming there are no unknown, unknowns lurking just over the horizon.
Unfortunately, bad things happen, especially in high risk, high technology ventures. When these
bad things happen even despite this inherently sound plan, the team's all failed to meet the
schedule deadline. Even bringing in the vaunted "A" players to save the day failed to meet
schedule (see third/fifth simulations).
Simulation and experimentation revealed two key drivers of "bad tidings": the role of testing and
the potential for a fundamental design flaw. For the purposes of our research, a discovered
design flaw is defined as a shock to the work to do and possibly revisiting work correctly
completed. First the role of testing when properly executed does in fact reduce the chance of
missed schedule. However, analysis reveals integration intervals in the order of four to six
months are needed in order to mitigate the "B" player's lack of leadership, technical ability and
foresight (see the fourth test case). Anything short than a disciplined approach built into the
very fabric of processes and leadership easily results in a missed schedule.
Secondly, design validation is inherently subjective measure based on the opinions of discipline
experts. Decisions based on objective, measurable data is few and far between. This is not to
say design validation lacks rigor or discipline nor are the experts really experts. Rather, the
information is subjective - or in our modeling terms perceived. As our analysis clearly shows,
especially in the successful project team and the test results scenarios, perceived closely
mirroring real fractions of complete yields successful outcomes. Without hard data to discover
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the unknown, unknowns, schedules are at risk. Perceived data is dangerous data. Analysis of
this shock of new work (or work generated from a design flaw) significantly drive a wide gap
between what was perceived to be complete and what was really complete. Decision in the
model reflected the real world were the perceived value is taken as gospel. As we have seen not
only in simulation but in our DoD program, decisions on perceived values if done long enough
without object measure will eventually lead to failure.
The following six heuristics are a result of the synthesis and simulation of both the literature
review and analysis sections of this study. These six heuristics are considered equal and are
presented in no particular order.
1) Innovation Triangle is real and does exist. Corporate strategy cannot starve portfolio
projects from the critical "A" team members. Their ability to scan the horizon, see 2 nd, 3rd
and fourth order effects is critical. Especially attention should be given to the start of the
integration period (in staged gate life cycle). Strategic Policy should consider bringing back
the initial "A" team members during the initial stages. It is during this stage where most
problems "magically" surface.
2) Test Early; Test Often. In an ideal world, if all managers had a crystal ball, they would be
able to peer into the project and actually see and measure the Fraction Really Complete.
Unfortunately, all managers operate on Fraction Perceived to be Complete. By reworking
schedules to allow for smaller development cycles with definitive integrations and test
periods, projects greatly reduce the impact of diverging Fraction Really Complete and
Fraction Perceived to be Complete. Decisions are then based on accurate information and
produce the intended effect. The longer testing lags, the larger the divergence, resulting in
less accurate information. Decisions made on poor data seldom result in the intended effect.
3) Quality is King! Quality not only determines the Work Completed Right but also generated
Undiscovered Rework. Undiscovered Rework are errors injected into the project because of
poor quality workmanship. Errors cause rework and rework causes iteration on the same
work believed to be completed. Today's managers heavily rely on Gant and Pert project
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management tools. Unfortunately the math behind the tools do not allow for iteration - or
loops. Iteration is bad. As such, by and large, the undiscovered rework is seldom recognized,
let alone managed.
4) Transitions are painful. Analysis indicates that even transitions between similar skill level
team members causes a worse before better condition. Experimentation reveals worse before
better hits quality hard, causing a sharp drop of 15-20% in quality before eventually
recovering. Worse, with a dramatic shift in personnel skill mix, a shift from architecture to
implementation, drastic quality hits can be seen in the worse before better mechanics. Here
drops of 30-40% in quality were seen during the transition time (settling time).
5) Retain Skeleton "A" staff. Projects should retain "skeleton "A" staff' even if only a small
percentage of their work week. This will prevent knowledge erosion. Additionally, the "A"
staff can impact performance with their foresight. Their internal clocks can sniff out lack or
progress long before detected by collecting project metrics. In addition, the "A" staff can
have a capabilities benefit. As previously discussed, the "A" player acts like a corporate
gatekeeper. This can benefit the program by keeping up with the latest developments not
only within the corporation but external as well.
6) "Lost Year"! The lost year (in our examples 6 months) is a result of early project dynamics.
Good initial project success is a double edged sword. Looks great, but cuts very deep.
Analysis revealed a delay caused by trying to erode this "initial success" or goodwill. This
caused an added delay in the detection of the poor performance. The delay allowed the
Fraction Perceived to be Complete and the Fraction Really Complete to diverge.
In conclusion, this research study challenges the A/B Teaming strategy as sound practice in
mitigating poorly aligned corporate objectives. The study also provides a set of heuristics that
can be used by program managers, development managers or even team leaders. Further study is
required on how to best implement these concepts and to what extent each should be
implemented. Finally, this effort demonstrates the power and flexibility of the System Dynamics
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methodology. The tool was invaluable in providing insight into the rise and collapse of the
complex, multimillion dollar program.
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Appendix A: Model Equations
Product Life Cycle Adjustment=-
Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality(Fraction Perceived to be Complete)
Dmnl
Manages the team transitions. Using the Base Fraction of A Given Full \
Quality (defines our key product life cycle stage gates) indexed by our \
perceived completion, make important staffing decisions.





Life cycle that manages team transitions
Fast Transition Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality(





Effect of Work Progress=
IF THEN ELSE( Use Early Table, Early Discovery Table for Effect of Work
Progress(MIN\




Drives the time to discover rework from its maximum value to the minimum \




Use as a toggle to reference the needed table.
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Lookup table translating work really complete into a rework discovery time
Pulse Shock Rate=





Total Work To Do=
STEP(Shock Impact, Shock Time)*Enable Shock+Initial Work To Do
Tasks
Fraction Perceived to be Complete=
Work Believed to be Done/Total Work To Do
Fraction
The fraction of work management believes is done correctly. This fraction \
includes undiscovered rework as well as work actually done correctly.
Planned Average Completion Rate=
Total Work To Do/Schedule Completion Date
Tasks/Month
What out plan originally calls for.
Fraction Really Complete=
Work Completed Right/Total Work To Do
Fraction
~- The fraction of work that is really complete in contrast to the fraction \
believed to be complete. The fraction really complete only includes work \
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Work To Do= INTEG (
+Pulse Shock Rate+Rework Discovery Rate-Rework Generation Rate-Work
Accomplished Rate\
Initial Work To Do)
Tasks
Work to do on the project includes the initial scope, plus tasks which \
include errors as these errors are discovered.
Feasible Work Rate=




Normal Quality*Team Skill Level*Effect of Prior Work Quality on Quality
Fraction
The fraction of work done correctly, and therefore becomes work done.
A Assignment Rate=
(Indicated A Staff-A Team Members)/Time To Adjust A Staff
People/Month
Flow (+/-) based on the indicated B staff and the current team numbers. \
This is smoothed out over the time constant.
A Staff Average Skill=
0.95
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~- Fraction
The fraction of work done correctly if all other endogenous factors are \
1.0. Normal quality reflects the fraction of work done correctly given \
the factors that are not included explicitly in the model.
A Staff Work Rate=
10
- Tasks/(Month*Person)
Tasks completed per Month
A Sub Team Work Rate=
A Staff Work Rate*A Team Members
Tasks/Month
A's portion of the tasks per month.
A Team Members= INTEG (
A Assignment Rate,
Initial Work To Do/Schedule Completion Date/A Staff Work Rate)
- People
Number of A players.
B Assignment Rate=
(Indicated B Staff-B Team Members)/Time To Adjust B Staff
People/Month
Flow (+/-) based on the indicated B staff and the current team numbers. \
This is smoothed out over the time constant.
B Staff Average Skill=
0.55
S Fraction
~ The fraction of work done correctly if all other endogenous factors are \
1.0. Normal quality reflects the fraction of work done correctly given \
the factors that are not included explicitly in the model.
B Staff Work Rate=
5
- Tasks/(Month*Person)
Tasks B Staff are able to complete per month
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B Sub Team Work Rate=
B Team Members*B Staff Work Rate
Tasks/Month
S What the B sub team members can complete with there skill level
B Team Members= INTEG (
B Assignment Rate,
Initial B Team Members)
People
Number of B members on the aggregate team
Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality(
[(0,0)-( 1, 1)](,1),(0. 1,1 ),(0.2,0.95),(0.3,0.85),(0.406728,0.701754),(0.489297,0.45614\
),(0.571865,0.276316),(0.672783,0.140351),(0.795107,0.109649),(0.9,0. 1),(1,0. 1))
Fraction
Life cycle that manages team transitions
Current Productivity=











Indicated Total Staff-Indicated A Staff
S People
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Indicated B staff based on productivity changes (increased staff) and \
quality issues (usually reducing there numbers). The reduction means that \
the A players have taken over some of the task already being worked on or \
will be worked on.
Minimum Time to Finish Work=
1
Month
For planning staffing, the minimum time over which management desires to \
complete the remaining tasks. Note that this is larger than the minimum \
time required to finish any one task.
Indicate Mangement Pressure to Add A=
Indicated Completion Rate/Planned Average Completion Rate
Dmnl
Based on what we planned, and our current needs, we might need to make a \
staffing decision to bring on additional A resources.
Indicated A Staff=
Indicated Fraction of A*Indicated Total Staff
People
~ Indicated A staff based quality issues (increase in numbers) and product \
life cycle progress (reduction in numbers)
Indicated Completion Rate=
Work To Do/Time Remaining
Tasks/Month
Amount of work to be done to get the project completed
Indicated Fraction of A=
Product Life Cycle Adjustment*Pressure to Change Fration of A
Fraction
Indicated fraction of A based on the current quality factors.
Indicated Total Staff=
Indicated Completion Rate/Current Productivity
People
Total staff need to complete the project on time given the current time, \
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productivty and initial schedule estimates





Initial Work To Do=
500
~~ Tasks




Time required to initially complete the schedule
Pressure to Change Fration of A=
Effect of Pressure(Indicate Mangement Pressure to Add A)
Dmnl
Based on the current perceived quality, we might need to bring back \
additional A resources.
Team Size=
A Team Members+B Team Members
People
~ Current Team Size
Team Skill Level=
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A Sub Team Work Rate+B Sub Team Work Rate
Tasks/Month
Total team work rate
Time Remaining =
Max(Minimum Time to Finish Work,Schedule Completion Date-Time)
Month
~ The months remaining before the project reaches the scheduled completion \
date. Once that date is reached, the model assumes that management tries \
to finish the project in a minimum time.
Time To Adjust A Staff=
3
- Month
S Time to find and add the critical A resource.
Time To Adjust B Staff=
0.25
S Month
Time to find and allocate a resource to the team. Additional time can be \
added to include amount of time to become productive as well
Effect of Prior Work Quality on Quality=
Sensitivity for Effect of Quality on Quality*Table for Effect of Prior Work Quality on
Quality\
(Average Work Quality)+(l -Sensitivity for Effect of Quality on Quality)
Dimensionless
This effect represents the fact that undiscovered errors in upstream work \
products tend to cause errors in current work. The effect is specified in \
the table relationship driven by average work quality to date, and can be \




~ The fraction of work done correctly if all other endogenous factors are \
1.0. Normal quality reflects the fraction of work done correctly given \
the factors that are not included explicitly in the model.
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Sensitivity for Effect of Quality on Quality=
1
Dimensionless
Increases or decreases the strength of the effect of prior quality on \
current quality specifed in the graphical relationship.





(Undiscovered Rework/Time To Discover Rework)
Tasks/Month
The rate of discovering errors in prior work products.
Undiscovered Rework= INTEG (
Rework Generation Rate-Rework Discovery Rate,
0)
Tasks
~- Work which contains errors and will need to be redone, but the need for \
which has not yet been recognized.
Max Work Rate=
Work To Do/Min Time to Finish Task
Tasks/Month
The maximum rate at which work can be accomplished given available tasks \
to do.
Min Time to Finish Task=
0.25
~ Month
The average minimum time it takes to execute a task.
Average Work Quality=
Max(le-006,Work Completed Right)/Max(l e-006,Work Believed to be Done)
Fraction
106
© Jeffrey Manning- All Rights Reserved jwm@sloan.mit.edu
The average quality of all the "upstream" work done to date. This equals \
work done (correctly) divided by total work done (which includes \
undiscovered rework).
Max Time to Discover Rework=
12
~ Month
The time to discover rework early in the project when strictly design \
tasks are being done.





Time To Discover Rework=
Max Time to Discover Rework*Effect of Work Progress+(1-Effect of Work
Progress)*Min Time To Discover Rework
Month
The average time between when an error is created and when it is \
discovered. This average is assumed to start at a maximum value early in \
the project, and then fall to a minimum value as the fraction of the \
project completed increases. Because this model represents the entire \
project, we assume that early activities create the design which is then \
later coded and tested (if software) or built (if hardware). Therefore, \
errors are most readily discovered when the project is in the code/test or \
build phases.
Work Believed to be Done=
Work Completed Right+Undiscovered Rework
Tasks
Work Believed to be done
Min Time To Discover Rework=
0.25
S Month
The time to discover rework late in the project when building and testing \
tasks are being done.
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Work being done incorrectly.








Work being done correctly.
.Control
Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME = 60
Month
The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
Month




The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.0625
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Month [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300 Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Team Mix
$192-192-192,0,Times New Romanl 12110-0-010-0-010-0-255|1-1--I-- 1-1--1-- 196,96,100,0
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300 Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Re-Work Cycle




























10,28,Time To Discover Rework,642,633,58,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,29,Max Time to Discover Rework,507,634,53,30,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
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1,33,28,7,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,11(631,601)1
1,34,3,6,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,11(752,528)1




10,38,Min Time to Finish Task,425,131,40,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0






10,45,Table for Effect of Work Progress,537,734,58,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0




10,50,Rework Generation Rate,1438,1001,41,29,8,130,1,3,-1 ,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-
128-128
10,5 1,Work Accomplished Rate, 1213,996,49,24,8,130,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-
128-128
1,52,21,67,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,1 (198,459)1






10,56,Work Completed Right,543,308,61,19,8,2,1,3,- 1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-
128






10,60,Rework Discovery Rate, 1031,883,38,25,8,130,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-
128-128
10,61,Fraction Perceived to be Complete, 1157,591,69,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,62,16,61,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,1 I(1098,681)1
10,63,Work Accomplished Rate,1 194,675,67,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-
128-128
110






R: Errors Build On Errors
10,67,Effect of Prior Work Quality on Quality,204,402,66,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,68,Sensitivity for Effect of Quality on Quality,105,471,72,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,69,68,67,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0-0,11(145,435)1
10,70,Table for Effect of Prior Work Quality on Quality,1 13,300,79,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,71,70,67,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,11(153,342)1
10,72,Indicated Completion Rate,1327,371,54,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,73,Indicated Total Staff, 1119,204,48,19,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,74,72,73,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,1]1(1224,294)1
10,75,Indicated Fraction of A,1388,51,43,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,76,Pressure to Change Fration of A,1511,177,62,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0





10,82,Minimum Time to Finish Work,1613,648,56,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,83,82,79,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,11(1515,577)1
1,84,79,72,1,0,45,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0,11(1379,480)1





10,90,Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality,1078,328,61,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,91,Product Life Cycle Adjustment,1203,442,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,92,Current Productivity,870,181,39,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,93,75,85,1,0,43,0,2,64,0,-1--1--1,112110-0-0, 1(1346,24)1
10,94,Indicate Mangement Pressure to Add A,1434,291,65,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
































10,122,B Staff Average Skill,210,-265,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,123,A Staff Average Skill,131,-160,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,124,B Sub Team Work Rate,508,-46,41,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,125,A Sub Team Work Rate,506,-214,41,19,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,126,A Staff Work Rate,448,-290,60,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0












10,139,Time To Adjust B Staff,890,-158,58,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,140,139,118,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,11(884,-103)1
10,141,Time To Adjust A Staff,932,-300,50,19,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,142,Team Size,178,-13,43,11,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128




















10,160,Initial Work To Do,438,545,49,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,161,Initial Work To Do,960,621,54,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128
10,162,Initial Work To Do,1317,668,54,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128

































10,193,Total Work To Do,966,619,54,19,8,2,0,3,- 1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128
1,194,193,19,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,11(917,592)1
1,195,193,61,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1 1(1053,618)1
10,196,Total Work To Do,1862,172,54,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128
10,197,Total Work To Do, 1604,272,54,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,11211128-128-128
1,198,197,95,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,11(1610,324)1




10,203,Fast Transition Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality,1298,668,77,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,204,Slowed Transition Base Fraction of A Given Full Quality,1302,757,77,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,205,90,91,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1 (1134,380)1
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Appendix B: Global Collage
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Appendix C: Alpha Collage
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Appendix D: Beta Collage
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Appendix E: Gamma Collage
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